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HEIGHTENED PLEADING: IS THERE LIFE
AFTER LEATHERMAN?
Karen M. Blum*
I. INTRODUCTION
Despite the language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2)' and
the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of that rule as merely
requiring notice pleading, 2 the majority of lower federal courts have im-
posed a more stringent pleading requirement upon plaintiffs in section
19831 cases in an attempt to weed out frivolous claims at the pleadings
stage. In Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordi-
nation Unit,4 the Supreme Court unanimously rejected the "heightened
* Professor of Law, Suffolk University Law School. The author wishes to express
her gratitude to former Dean Paul Sugarman and Suffolk University Law School for pro-
viding the financial and moral support necessary to do the research and writing of this
Article.
1. Rule 8(a)(2) provides that a complaint shall contain "a short and plain statement
of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
2. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957). The Court in Conley held that the rule
simply requires the plaintiff to "give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim
is and the grounds upon which it rests." Id.
3. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988). Section 1983 provides in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State ...subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of
any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be
liable to the party injured ....
Id.
4. 113 S. Ct. 1160 (1993). On remand, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's adoption of its earlier alternative grant of sum-
mary judgment. Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination
Unit, 28 F.3d 1388, 1390 (5th Cir. 1994). For an excellent discussion of Leatherman and a
critical analysis of the heightened pleading standard, see Eric H. Cottrell, Note, Civil
Rights Plaintiffs, Clogged Courts, and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: The Supreme
Court Takes a Look at Heightened Pleading Standards in Leatherman v. Tarrant County
Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 72 N.C. L. REV. 1085 (1994).
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pleading standard" 5 applied by the majority of lower federal courts6 in
cases alleging municipal liability under section 1983. 7
In addition to cases alleging municipal liability, federal courts have ap-
plied the heightened pleading standard to section 1983 cases asserting in-
dividual capacity claims in which qualified immunity is a potential
defense;' cases asserting individual capacity claims in which state of mind
5. See generally Douglas A. Blaze, Presumed Frivolous: Application of Stringent
Pleading Requirements in Civil Rights Litigation, 31 WM. & MARY L. REV. 935 (1990)
(providing extensive examination of the history and development of the heightened plead-
ing standard, along with a thorough analysis and criticism of the rationale underlying the
doctrine). This Article concurs with the conclusion reached by Professor Blaze that "the
heightened pleading requirement simply is unnecessary." Id. at 990; see also C. Keith Win-
gate, A Special Pleading Rule for Civil Rights Complaints: A Step Forward or a Step Back?,
49 Mo. L. REV. 677, 693 (1984) (criticizing the application by courts of a heightened plead-
ing standard in civil rights cases to weed out frivolous claims).
6. See, e.g., Sivard v. Pulaski County, 959 F.2d 662, 667 (7th Cir. 1992) ("This Court
demands that plaintiffs suing a municipal body under § 1983 plead with greater specificity
than might ordinarily be required."); Palmer v. City of San Antonio, 810 F.2d 514, 516-17
(5th Cir. 1987). The Palmer court explained that it has:
consistently required a section 1983 plaintiff to state specific facts and not merely
conclusory allegations. While it might be possible that a basis for municipal liabil-
ity exists in this case, Palmer states no facts in his complaint to support his asser-
tion that San Antonio authorized and approved the practice of its police officers
using excessive force when making arrests or that such a well settled practice of
doing so existed .... As we have made clear, the assertion of a single incident is
not sufficient to show that a policy or custom exists on the part of a municipality.
Id. (citation omitted).
7. Leatherman, 113 S. Ct. at 1163. Preceding the Supreme Court's decision, the Fifth
Circuit had upheld dismissal of a complaint against a governmental entity for failure to
plead with the requisite specificity. Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence
& Coordination Unit, 954 F.2d 1054, 1058 (5th Cir. 1992), rev'd, 113 S. Ct. 1160 (1993).
The case arose out of two separate incidents involving execution of search warrants by
local law enforcement officers. The Fifth Circuit concluded that "[w]hile plaintiffs' com-
plaint sets forth the facts concerning the police misconduct in great detail, it fails to state
any facts with respect to the adequacy (or inadequacy) of the police training." Id.
Judge Goldberg wrote both the majority opinion and an opinion concurring specially. In
his special concurrence, Judge Goldberg noted the numerous articles and essays by influen-
tial commentators who argue that a heightened pleading requirement is incompatible with
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. at 1059 (Goldberg, J., concurring specially) (list-
ing articles criticizing heightened pleading requirement). While impressed by the "wealth
of authority" supporting plaintiffs' position, Judge Goldberg concluded that Fifth Circuit
precedent constrained the panel. Id. at 1061.
In 1985, the Fifth Circuit initially adopted the heightened pleading standard in individual
capacity suits, where the defense of qualified immunity was likely to be raised. See Elliott
v. Perez, 751 F.2d 1472, 1473 (5th Cir. 1985). Similarly, in Palmer, the Fifth Circuit applied
the heightened pleading standard in a case brought against a municipality. Palmer, 810
F.2d at 516-17. Thus, as Judge Goldberg observed in Leatherman, under both Elliott and
Palmer the heightened pleading requirement applies to all section 1983 complaints brought
in the Fifth Circuit. Leatherman, 954 F.2d at 1058.
8. See, e.g., Oladeinde v. City of Birmingham, 963 F.2d 1481, 1485 (11th Cir. 1992),
cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1586 (1993). The Oladeinde court noted:
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is an essential component of the underlying constitutional claim;9 and
cases asserting a conspiracy." While Leatherman unequivocally disposes
of the heightened standard in municipal liability cases, the verdict is out
on Leatherman's impact upon the imposition of a heightened standard in
other contexts. One commentator has observed that "[t]he varied reac-
tions of lower courts to the Leatherman decision suggest that the Court
[W]e want to use this opportunity to repeat that, "in an effort to eliminate non-
meritorious claims on the pleadings and to protect public officials from protracted
litigation involving specious claims, we, and other courts, have tightened the ap-
plication of Rule 8 to § 1983 cases." In pleading a section 1983 action, some fac-
tual detail is necessary, especially if we are to be able to see that the allegedly
violated right was clearly established when the allegedly wrongful acts occurred.
We also stress that this heightened Rule 8 requirement. . . must be applied by the
district courts ....
Id. at 1485 (citation omitted); Jackson v. City of Beaumont Police Dep't, 958 F.2d 616, 620
(5th Cir. 1992) (indicating that the Fifth Circuit "requires that § 1983 plaintiffs meet height-
ened pleading requirements in cases ... in which an immunity defense can be raised" by
" 'plead[ing] specific facts that, if proved, would overcome the individual defendant's im-
munity defense' " (quoting Geter v. Fortenberry, 849 F.2d 1550, 1553 (5th Cir. 1988)));
Sawyer v. County of Creek, 908 F.2d 663, 665-66 (10th Cir. 1990) (noting that "prior to
filing an affirmative defense, a defendant can challenge a complaint by filing either a mo-
tion to dismiss or a motion for summary judgment if the plaintiff has failed to come for-
ward with facts or allegations that establish that the defendant has violated clearly
established law"). But see Hunter v. District of Columbia, 943 F.2d 69, 75-77 (D.C. Cir.
1991) (explaining that "the heightened pleading requirement is not contingent upon the
existence of a substantively distinct qualified immunity 'defense,' " rather "[w]hen a plain-
tiff claims that an officer used excessive force, the heightened pleading standard demands
that he make 'nonconclusory allegations of evidence' sufficient to demonstrate that the
force used actually was unreasonable").
In Elliott v. Thomas, 937 F.2d 338 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1242 (1992),
Judge Easterbrook noted the potential conflict between a " 'heightened pleading require-
ment' " and the relatively minimal requirements set out by Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure 8 and 9(b). Id. at 345. He resolved the apparent inconsistency by speaking in terms
of the minimum amount of proof required to defeat the initial motion for summary judg-
ment and devaluing the heightened pleading requirement. Id. A plaintiff need not antici-
pate an immunity defense in her pleadings, Judge Easterbrook explained. Id. But once
the defense is raised in the answer and the defendant moves for summary judgment on
qualified immunity grounds, then plaintiff must produce " 'specific, nonconclusory factual
allegations which establish [the necessary mental state], or face dismissal.' " Id. at 344-45
(alteration in original) (quoting Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 236 (1991) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring)).
9. See, e.g., Branch v. Tunnell, 937 F.2d 1382, 1387 (9th Cir. 1991) (adopting height-
ened pleading standard with allegations of motivation supportable by direct or circumstan-
tial evidence in cases in which a plaintiff accused an officer of deliberately or recklessly
misleading a magistrate to obtain search warrants); Pueblo Neighborhood Health Ctrs.,
Inc. v. Losavio, 847 F.2d 642, 649 (10th Cir. 1988) (explaining that "[w]here ... subjective
intent is an element of the plaintiff's claim and the defendant has moved for summary
judgment based on a showing of the objective reasonableness of his actions, the plaintiff
may avoid summary judgment only by pointing to specific evidence that the official's ac-
tions were improperly motivated").
10. See, e.g., Crabtree v. Muchmore, 904 F.2d 1475, 1481 (10th Cir. 1990).
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needs to clarify what circumstances, if any, would justify a heightened
standard."'
This Article examines lower federal court case law after Leatherman.
First, the Article exposes the divergent views courts have adopted as to
Leatherman's reach-underscoring the need for Supreme Court clarifica-
tion. Second, the Article questions the tenacity with which some courts
adhere to the heightened pleading standard in the wake of Leatherman-
refusing to extend the rationale of the decision beyond its facts.
After a brief discussion of Leatherman and its effect on municipal lia-
bility cases, this Article addresses the validity of heightened pleading in
individual capacity suits. An examination of pre-Leatherman case law, as
well as the Supreme Court's avoidance and reservation of the issue in
Siegert v. Gilley 2 and Leatherman, will set the groundwork for a review
of current case law. This Article primarily focuses on post-Leatherman
decisions of the courts of appeals that address the issue of heightened
pleading. Specifically, it addresses the tension created between a plaintiff
who must allege impermissible motive to state a justiciable claim and a
defendant who is entitled to an early disposition of his qualified immunity
defense based on the objective reasonableness of his conduct. 13 These
cases expose a range of options confronting lower courts after
Leatherman and the need for guidance from the Supreme Court.
This Article concludes by challenging the assumption that the Supreme
Court's decision in Harlow v. Fitzgerald'4 mandates that a plaintiff, alleg-
ing constitutional claims requiring proof of a defendant's subjective in-
tent, is required to satisfy more rigorous pleading standards than required
under the Federal Rules. In light of common sense, consistency, and fair-
ness, this Article recommends that the courts adopt the approach taken
by the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, shifting
11. Cottrell, supra note 4, at 1100 (footnote omitted).
12. 500 U.S. 226 (1991). In Siegert, the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit dismissed plaintiff's complaint for failure to satisfy a heightened
pleading requirement that calls for the pleading of direct evidence of motive in cases in
which state of mind is an essential element of the plaintiff's underlying constitutional
claim. Siegert v. Gilley, 895 F.2d 797, 800-01, 803-04 (D.C. Cir. 1990), aff'd on other
grounds, 500 U.S. 226 (1991).
13. See, e.g., Tompkins v. Vickers, 26 F.3d 603, 607-08 (5th Cir. 1994); Mendocino
Envtl. Ctr. v. Mendocino County, 14 F.3d 457, 461 (9th Cir. 1994); Branch v. TInnell, 14
F.3d 449, 452-53 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2704 (1994); Triad Assocs., Inc. v. Robin-
son, 10 F.3d 492, 496-97 (7th Cir. 1993); Kimberlin v. Quinlan, 6 F.3d 789, 793-94 & n.9
(D.C. Cir. 1993), cert. granted, 115 S. Ct. 929 (1995).
14. 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
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the emphasis from a special pleading burden to the burden that a plaintiff
has under a normal summary judgment procedure. 15
II. LEA THERMAN AND MUNICIPAL LIABILITY CASES
In rejecting the heightened pleading standard in Leatherman, the
Supreme Court rebuffed two distinct arguments put forth by the defend-
ants in support of applying heightened pleading in suits against munici-
palities. First, the defendants equated a municipality's freedom from
respondeat superior liability under section 198316 to an individual offi-
cial's qualified or absolute immunity from suit.t7 Assuming the sound-
ness of a heightened pleading standard in individual capacity suits, an
15. See Triad, 10 F.3d at 497; infra notes 95-105 and accompanying text; see also Elli-
ott v. Thomas, 937 F.2d 338, 344 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1242 (1992).
16. In Monell v. New York City Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978),
the Supreme Court overruled Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), overruled in part by
Monell v. Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978), to the extent Monroe held that mu-
nicipalities were totally immune from suit under section 1983. Monell, 436 U.S. at 961.
Monell held that a local government could be sued under section 1983 when official policy
or custom caused a constitutional injury, but could not be held liable merely because it
employed a tortfeasor. Id. See generally Karen M. Blum, From Monroe to Monell: Defin-
ing the Scope of Municipal Liability in Federal Courts, 51 TEMP. L.Q. 409 (1978).
17. Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 113 S.
Ct. 1160, 1162 (1993). A government official may invoke one of two types of immunity
from personal liability for damages: absolute or qualified immunity. Forrester v. White,
484 U.S. 219, 224 (1988). The Supreme Court has adopted a "'functional' " approach to
immunity, so that whether an official is entitled to absolute or qualified immunity will
depend on the function performed by that official in a particular context. Id. The
Supreme Court has afforded officials performing judicial, legislative, or prosecutorial func-
tions absolute immunity. See, e.g., Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 12-13 (1991) (per curiam)
(granting absolute judicial immunity when conduct is in excess of jurisdiction rather than in
absence of jurisdiction); Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478,492,496 (1991) (providing a prosecu-
tor absolute immunity for functions performed in probable cause hearing, but only quali-
fied immunity attached to function of giving legal advice to police); Forrester 484 U.S. at
228-29 (noting that a judge has absolute immunity only when acting in judicial, as opposed
to administrative, capacity); Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning
Agency, 440 U.S. 391, 406 (1979) (finding absolute immunity for members of a regional
land planning agency acting in legislative capacity); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 364
(1978) (finding absolute immunity for judge acting within jurisdiction); Imbler v.
Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 424-26 (1976) (providing absolute immunity for prosecutors per-
forming prosecutorial acts); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 376 (1951) (finding abso-
lute immunity for members of Congress); see also Watts v. Burkhart, 978 F.2d 269, 274 (6th
Cir. 1992) (en banc) (affording absolute immunity to members of state medical licensing
board sued in their individual capacities with respect to suspension or revocation of doc-
tor's license).
In Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 113 S. Ct. 2606 (1993), the Supreme Court held that prosecu-
tors do not have absolute immunity with respect to claims that they had fabricated evi-
dence during the preliminary investigation of a crime and had made false statements at a
press conference announcing the arrest and indictment of petitioner. Id. at 2615; see also
Antoine v. Byers & Anderson, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2167, 2172 (1993) (holding that a court
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assumption the Court had "no occasion to consider,"' 8 defendants con-
tended that a lesser pleading requirement would result in a waste of time,
money, and resources of municipalities.'
The Court summarily and emphatically dismissed this argument by at-
tacking the erroneous notion that municipalities had some sort of immu-
nity from suit under section 1983. The Court's previous decisions clarify
reporter is not entitled to absolute immunity from damages for failing to produce tran-
script of federal criminal trial).
Most government officials are entitled only to qualified immunity. In Harlow v. Fitzger-
ald, the Supreme Court adopted an objective test for qualified immunity. Harlow, 457
U.S. at 818. Under Harlow, "government officials performing discretionary functions gen-
erally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate
clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would
have known." Id. In Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987), the Court elaborated
that "[t]he contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would
understand that what he is doing violates that right." Id. at 640. Because qualified immu-
nity provides not only immunity from liability, but immunity from suit, Mitchell v. Forsyth,
472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985), the Court has stressed that the immunity issue ordinarily should
be decided long before trial. Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 228 (1991). For an analysis of
the doctrine of qualified immunity elsewhere, see generally Karen M. Blum, Qualified Im-
munity: A User's Manual, 26 IND. L. REv. 187 (1993).
The Supreme Court recently held that private persons, named as defendants in section
1983 suits challenging their use of state replevin, garnishment, or attachment statutes later
held unconstitutional, cannot invoke the qualified immunity available to government offi-
cials in such suits. Wyatt v. Cole, 112 S. Ct. 1827, 1834 (1992). On remand, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that "private defendants, at least those
invoking ex parte prejudgment statutes, should not be held liable under § 1983 absent a
showing of malice and evidence that they either knew or should have known of the stat-
ute's constitutional infirmity." Wyatt v. Cole, 994 F.2d 1113, 1120 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
114 S. Ct. 470 (1993).
Commenting on the Fifth Circuit decision, the Third Circuit has indicated that although
"Wyatt overrules the district court's holding that the [defendants] are entitled to qualified
immunity, it leaves open the question whether private parties acting under color of state
law can raise an affirmative defense of good faith in a section 1983 action." Jordan v. Fox,
Rothschild, O'Brien & Frankel, 20 F.3d 1250, 1276-77 (3d Cir. 1994) (footnotes omitted).
The Third Circuit explained that it agreed with the Fifth Circuit in Wyatt, but that malice
under these circumstances "means a creditor's subjective appreciation that its act deprives
the debtor of his constitutional right to due process." Id. The Third Circuit concluded that
" 'good faith' gives state actors a defense that depends on their subjective state of mind,
rather than the more demanding objective standard of reasonable belief that governs quali-
fied immunity." Id.
Distinguishing the case before it from Wyatt, the Seventh Circuit allowed a private hos-
pital to "raise a qualified immunity defense for administering anti-psychotic medication" to
the plaintiff because it refused "to give private hospitals the Hobson's choice of obeying a
court's order directing discretionary medical treatment, and facing liability for the resulting
medical judgment, or refusing to make a medical judgment, and exposing hospital staff and
patients to the risk of harm posed by a potentially violent mental patient." Sherman v.
Four County Counseling Ctr., 987 F.2d 397, 406 (7th Cir. 1993).
18. Leatherman, 113 S. Ct. at 1162.
19. Id.
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that municipalities cannot avail themselves of any type of immunity from
suit.2" Thus, defendants could not avail themselves of an immunity from
suit rationale to justify a heightened pleading requirement in claims
against local governments.
Defendants' second contention was that, in the context of suits against
municipalities under section 1983, the nature of the substantive claim re-
quired that plaintiffs plead more than an instance of misconduct to state a
claim under ordinary notice pleading requirements. 21 In essence, defend-
ants argued that there really was no heightened pleading requirement im-
posed upon plaintiffs by the lower court.22 An assertion of municipal
liability for failure to train police adequately must demonstrate a pattern
of similar constitutional violations by police officers to satisfy the requi-
site deliberate indifference to such conduct on the part of the municipal
defendant.23 Thus, the specificity in the complaint is dependant on the
nature of the underlying substantive claim being asserted by plaintiffs.24
The defendants' argument was not persuasive to the Supreme Court.
After examining Fifth Circuit case law, the Court concluded that "the
'heightened pleading standard' is just what it purports to be: a more de-
manding rule for pleading a complaint under. § 1983 than for pleading
other kinds of claims for relief."'25 Finding it difficult to equate the
heightened pleading requirement with the liberal notice pleading system
of the Federal Rules, the Supreme Court suggested that Rules 8(a)(2) 26
and 9(b) 27 would have to be rewritten to incorporate such a heightened
20. Id. The Court noted that Monel, 436 U.S. at 701, expressly reserved the question
of whether local governments were entitled to some form of limited immunity in suits
brought under section 1983, and that the Court rejected any type of immunity for munici-
palities in such suits in Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 650 (1980).
Leatherman, 113 S. Ct. at 1162.
21. Leatherman, 113 S. Ct. at 1162.
22. Id.
23. See, e.g., City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989) ("[T]he inadequacy of
police training may serve as the basis for § 1983 liability only where the failure to train
amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the police come into
contact."); Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 823 (1985) ("[C]onsiderably more proof
than the single incident will be necessary in every case to establish both the requisite fault
on the part of the municipality, and the causal connection between the 'policy' and the
constitutional deprivation." (footnote omitted)).
24. Leatherman, 113 S. Ct. at 1162.
25. Id. at 1162-63. The Court noted that the Fifth Circuit had adopted the heightened
pleading standard in Elliott v. Perez, 751 F.2d 1472 (5th Cir. 1985), a case involving individ-
ual liability, and then, in Palmer v. City of San Antonio, 810 F.2d 514 (5th Cir. 1987),
extended the rule to section 1983 cases against municipalities. Leatherman, 113 S. Ct. at
1163.
26. See supra note 1.
27. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) provides that "[i]n all averments of fraud or
mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with particularity.
1994]
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pleading standard.2 8 The Court suggested that without such an amend-
ment, "federal courts and litigants must rely on summary judgment and
control of discovery to weed out unmeritorious claims sooner rather than
later. '2
9
In reversing the Fifth Circuit, the Court noted the conflict among the
courts of appeals on the issue of heightened pleading in municipal liabil-
ity cases3" and cited approvingly the Ninth Circuit's opinion in Karim-
Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Department.31 In Karim-Panahi, the Ninth
Circuit required no more than an allegation that an individual officer's
behavior "conformed to official policy, custom, or practice., 32  Post-
Leatherman lower court decisions uniformly have abandoned the height-
ened pleading standard that applied in municipal liability cases, requiring
only bare allegations or the minimum mandated by Rule 8(a)(2), to put
the defendant on notice of the claim.33
Malice, intent, knowledge, and other condition of mind of a person may be averred gener-
ally." FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b).
28. Leatherman, 113 S. Ct. at 1163.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 1162-63.
31. 839 F.2d 621 (9th Cir. 1988).
32. Id. at 624.
33. See, e.g., Wayfield v. Town of Tisbury, No. 93-1535, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 30997,
at *1 (1st Cir. Nov. 29, 1993) (reversing the district court for relying "in part on the doc-
trine that civil rights complaints must be pled with heightened particularity" and finding
that "[t]he proper standard for assessing the adequacy of the instant complaint then is
whether, accepting the factual allegations in the complaint as true, and construing these
facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the pleading shows any facts which could
entitle plaintiff to relief"), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2764 (1994); Kohl v. Casson, 5 F.3d 1141,
1148 (8th Cir. 1993) (noting that Leatherman rejected a requirement that plaintiff allege
"particular instances of similar constitutional violations in order to defeat a motion to dis-
miss for failure to state a claim" and finding "the district court's rationale for dismissing
the complaint" unsustainable); Watson v. Dowling, No. 93 CIV. 5839 (PKL), 1994 WL
319295, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. June 29, 1994) (finding that the "plaintiffs have met their burden
by alleging the existence of a state policy of inadequate training and supervision" even
though a single incident gave rise to the lawsuit); McGrath v. MacDonald, 853 F. Supp. 1,
5-6 (D. Mass. 1994) (finding that the "plaintiff's complaint satisfies the standard enunci-
ated under Leatherman" because it "provides the City with fair notice of plaintiff's claims
and sufficiently sets forth facts to outline the City's liability as a municipality"); Goldsmith
v. City of Chicago, No. 93 C 1626, 1993 WL 532445, at *4 n.1 (N.D. 111. Dec. 21, 1993)
(explaining that [iut used to be clear that a single allegation of misconduct could not gener-
ally state a claim for municipal policy liability" but that Leatherman rejects this rule); John-
son v. Lancaster County Children & Youth Social Serv. Agency, No. Civ.A.92-7135, 1993
WL 245280, at *9 (E.D. Pa. July 2, 1993) (explaining that "Leatherman cast doubt upon the
Third Circuit's heightened pleading standard for section 1983 claims"); Simpkins v. Belle-
vue Hosp., 832 F. Supp. 69, 73 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (holding a plaintiff is no longer required to
state precisely in his complaint the policy by which he alleges the defendants violated his
rights); Hall v. Lopez, 823 F. Supp. 857, 866 (D. Colo. 1993) (holding that the plaintiff's
bare allegation that the City's policy or custom of encouraging no-knock searches was the
moving force behind the violation of her constitutional rights was probably sufficient to
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In Jordan by Jordan v. Jackson, 4 the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit addressed the application of Leatherman in a case
involving governmental liability." The Fourth Circuit made some inter-
esting observations concerning the scope of Leatherman in this context.
The facts alleged in Jordan by Jordan strike fear in the hearts of working
parents.3 6 The Jordans were employed fulltime.3 7 Babysitters cared for
the youngest two of their three children when not in school.38 The
Jordans allowed Christopher, their ten-year-old son, to come home from
school and take care of himself for about an hour and a half until Mr. and
Mrs. Jordan returned home from work.39 Christopher was taught to take
care of himself and was required to call one or both parents upon arriving
home.40
Someone reported to the Prince William County Department of Social
Services (DSS) that Christopher was often home alone and was involved
withstand a motion to dismiss after Leatherman); Ciccotosto v. Holem, No. 92-C20065,
1993 WL 87722, at *3 (N.D. I1l. Mar. 26, 1993) (concluding that "the Supreme Court was
quite clear in mandating that a plaintiff need only set forth a short and plain statement
regarding municipal liability for purposes of a motion to dismiss"); Hammond v. Town of
Cicero, 822 F. Supp. 512,515 (N.D. II. 1993) (explaining that "JuInder Leatherman, district
courts may no longer impose heightened pleading requirements on plaintiffs asserting Mo-
nell claims" and must allow plaintiffs to advance a Monell claim if such claim "satisfies
both the traditional Conley pleading requirements and Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2)").
34. 15 F.3d 333 (4th Cir. 1994).
35. Id. at 337-40. The Fourth Circuit indicated it confronted "a question of first im-
pression in this circuit, and it is a question apparently not addressed in any other circuit
either since ... Leatherman." Id. at 337. The Court made no direct reference to Kohl v.
Casson, 5 F.3d 1141 (8th Cir. 1993). In Kohl, the district court had dismissed a complaint
against city and county defendants in their official capacities, on the ground that plaintiff
"had failed to allege a pattern of similar incidents of unlawful arrest or that the city and
county had notice of prior acts of police and prosecutorial misconduct." Id. at 1148. The
court of appeals noted that the Supreme Court in Leatherman "held that requiring a plain-
tiff to allege particular instances of similar constitutional violations in order to defeat a
motion to dismiss" was inconsistent with the notice pleading standard of the Federal Rules.
Id. Thus, the Eighth Circuit concluded that the district court's rationale for dismissing the
complaint against the government defendants was probably not sustainable. Id. The court
had no need to pursue the matter, however, because it went on to uphold the dismissal on
other grounds. Id.
36. Jordan by Jordan, 15 F.3d at 336. The Fourth Circuit opinion began as follows:
We address in this appeal the awesome and, regrettably, sometimes necessary,
power of the state to take custody of children from their parents in order to pro-
tect the children from irreparable injury or death. We confront herein allegations
against the state in connection with its exercise of that power that, if true, are
disturbing, and that we hope are exceptional.
Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
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in fights with other children. 4' DSS assigned the matter to a social
worker who confronted Christopher on a Friday afternoon as he walked
home from the bus stop.42 The social worker made no attempt to contact
the Jordans or seek any supplemental information regarding the family.43
Christopher, reacting as most children are instructed when approached
by a stranger, ran away and tried to hide." The social worker seized
Christopher pursuant to a Virginia statute 45 that permits the taking into
custody of a child for up to seventy-two hours without prior approval of
the parents when the child's life or health is determined to be in immi-
nent danger.46 She left a handwritten note on the Jordans' door, inform-
ing them that Christopher had been taken into custody and would be in
foster care for at least three days.47
The Jordans, upon arriving home and finding the note, feared that
Christopher was kidnapped.48 They immediately contacted the police
who confirmed that Christopher was in foster care and that the Jordans
could have no contact with him until Monday.49 On Monday, Christo-
pher was reunited with his parents.5"
The Jordans brought a section 1983 action against Prince William
County and the County DSS, challenging the initial summary removal of
Christopher by the DSS as a violation of due process.51 The plaintiffs
alleged that their constitutional injury resulted from the defendants'
maintenance of "various municipal policies or customs that proximately
caused Christopher's allegedly unlawful removal.""2 The district court,
viewing the allegations as simply asserting a claim under respondeat supe-
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-248.9 (Michie Supp. 1993).
46. Jordan by Jordan, 15 F.3d at 336.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. Plaintiffs maintained that the summary removal of Christopher "violated the
guarantees of due process by unjustifiably interfering with the integrity and privacy of their
family." Id. As such, this claim appears to allege a violation of substantive due process.
The Jordans originally included as defendants the Commissioner of the Virginia DSS and
the Manager of the Virginia Child Protective Services Program, but, on appeal, abandoned
claims against these officials. Id. The individual social worker who removed Christopher
was not named as a defendant. Id. at 340 n.6. The complaint also challenged the constitu-
tionality of the state statute (Va. Code § 63.1-248.9(A)(6)) that permits delayed judicial
review (up to seventy-two hours) of the emergency removal of a child from his home. Id.
at 341. The court concluded that the statute was constitutional both facially and as applied.
Id. at 341-56.
52. Id. at 337.
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rior, dismissed for failure to state a claim.53 On appeal, the defendants,
arguing in support of the district court's dismissal, contended that the
Jordans' failure to allege multiple incidents of misconduct in their com-
plaint made the complaint fatally deficient and subject to dismissal under
Rule 12(b)(6).54
The Fourth Circuit disagreed. Recognizing that substantive law places
stringent requirements upon plaintiffs asserting municipal liability under
section 1983, the Fourth Circuit noted the Supreme Court's rejection in
Leatherman of the argument that pleading requirements in such cases
ought to parallel what must be ultimately proved on the merits. The
court read Leatherman as repudiating requirements that facts be set out
in detail or that multiple incidents be included in pleadings asserting mu-
nicipal liability under section 1983.56
Perhaps of more significance than the Fourth Circuit's holding as to the
breadth of Leatherman concerning suits involving local governments, is
the Fourth Circuit's dicta as to what Leatherman does not mean for dis-
trict court judges who fear that Leatherman may have opened the litiga-
tion floodgates. The Supreme Court counseled that, in the absence of a
heightened pleading standard mandated by the Federal Rules, discovery
and summary judgment procedures must be used to weed out frivolous
suits. 57 The court of appeals expands upon this counsel and makes clear
that Leatherman is not to be viewed as a license for plaintiffs to engage in
unbridled discovery of municipalities to "cobble together support for
what were conclusory allegations of an impermissible municipal policy."5"
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 338. The Fourth Circuit observed that there was some uncertainty "as to the
precise 'heightened standard' rejected by the Court in Leatherman." Id. As the court
explained, although the Leatherman defendants argued, at the Supreme Court level, that
multiple incidents must be pleaded, the Fifth Circuit in Leatherman found the complaint
deficient for failure to plead sufficient underlying facts with respect to the policies alleged
to have caused the two incidents that were the subject of plaintiffs' complaint. Id. at 338-
39. The Fourth Circuit concluded, however, that
[a]lthough the Court never referenced a requirement of pleading multiple inci-
dents in its description of the Fifth Circuit's standard or in its analysis, it is appar-
ent that the several-paragraph discussion following its statement of respondents'
specific contention that multiple incidents must be pleaded was intended as a di-
rect response to that contention.
Id. at 339.
56. Id. The Fourth Circuit was careful to reserve opinion of the question left unan-
swered by the Supreme Court, whether a heightened pleading standard might be justified
in individual capacity suits where qualified immunity is available. Id. at 339 n.5.
57. Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 113 S.
Ct. 1160, 1163 (1993).
58. Jordan by Jordan, 15 F.3d at 340.
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Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 44:59
District courts should continue to exercise their discretion to deny discov-
ery that amounts to "little more than fishing expeditions.- 59 Further-
more, the Fourth Circuit emphasized that it is the responsibility of district
court judges to award summary judgment against plaintiffs when it is
clear they are unable to prevail on their substantive claims against munic-
ipalities.6" The court concluded by exhorting lower courts not to view
Leatherman's breadth as denigrating the procedural tools that exist in the
Federal Rules to stymie the "explosion of meritless lawsuits in the federal
court system." 6
1
Based on Leatherman and the pleading principles expounded in that
case, the Fourth Circuit determined that the Jordans' complaint was suffi-
cient to withstand a motion to dismiss.62 The court stressed, however,
that Leatherman merely allowed the plaintiffs to proceed to the summary
judgment stage, where more stringent requirements would have to be
overcome to prevail.63
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. Other courts have similarly expressed the sentiment that Leatherman should
not be construed so as to leave district courts procedurally less equipped to deal with non-
meritorious claims. The United States District Court for the District of New Hampshire
observed in Quimby v. Division for Children & Youth Services., No. CIV.93-351-B, 1994
WL 258576, at *2-3 (D.N.H. Mar. 31, 1994) that:
Care is required in determining the sufficiency of a complaint to insure that
"heightened pleading" requirements are invoked only if such requirements are
specifically authorized by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. However, even
under the general pleading requirements of Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a), a complaint will
not withstand a motion to dismiss if the plaintiff has merely recited the elements
of the complaint's causes of action in conclusory terms. Notice pleadings require
factual allegations which, if true, will establish all of the required elements of
plaintiff's causes of action. Moreover, where it is evident from plaintiff's re-
sponse to a motion to dismiss that the complaint cannot be amended to allege
such facts, a court may deny the plaintiff leave to amend and dismiss the
complaint.
Id. (citations omitted). Similarly, in Feliciano v. Dubois, 846 F. Supp. 1033 (D. Mass.
1994), the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts stated:
[E]ven if Leatherman were construed as precluding a court from requiring of
plaintiffs an amended complaint that met particularity-of-claim requirements, it
probably should not be construed as precluding a court from making an early case
management order requiring that, in some form of written submission to the court
... the plaintiff clarify ambiguous claims to enable opposing parties and the court
to evaluate jurisdictional and other potentially dispositive issues.
Id. at 1043.
62. Jordan by Jordan, 15 F.3d at 340. The complaint essentially alleged that the county
defendants had an official policy or custom of inadequately training employees in deter-
mining the need for summary removal, encouraged the removal of any child left alone, and
condoned improper conduct of their social workers. Id. The Jordans alleged that such
policies caused the unconstitutional removal of Christopher from his parents' custody. Id.
63. Id. at 340-41.
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III. INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY SUITS AND THE QUALIFIED IMMUNITY
DEFENSE
A. Pre-Leatherman
When notice pleading encounters individual officials' qualified immu-
nity from suit in section 1983 cases, the courts are presented with what
has been referred to as the task of "accommodat[ing] an exquisite con-
frontation."' The resolution of this confrontation depends upon how a
court characterizes the immunity defense, the claim asserted in the con-
flict, and whether the court perceives a conflict at all.
In Elliott v. Perez,6 5 the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit observed that "[t]he public goals sought by official immunity are
not procedural. Indeed, they go to very fundamental substantive objec-
tives."66 As such, the immunity defense embodies a substantive right that
cannot be abridged, modified, or enlarged by a Federal Rule.6 7 To the
extent that Rule 8(a)(2) authorizes mere notice pleading, with reliance on
liberal use of discovery to uncover facts in support of plaintiff's claim, the
Fifth Circuit determined that the Rule must be tailored to assure the de-
fendant's substantive right to "be freed from the burdens, the stress, the
anxieties and the diversions of pretrial preparations."68 Thus, the major-
ity of the panel in Elliott viewed heightened pleading as a judicial adapta-
tion of a rule of procedure necessary to avoid the abridgement of a
substantive right.
Judge Higginbotham, concurring specially with the Fifth Circuit deci-
sion, was uncomfortable with judicially tinkering with legislative determi-
64. Elliott v. Perez, 751 F.2d 1472, 1482 (5th Cir. 1985) (Higginbotham, J., concurring
specially). As Judge Easterbrook appropriately questioned, "How is it possible simultane-
ously to preserve remedies for egregious wrongdoing and nip in the bud efforts to prolong
the agony of defendants who are fated to win under Harlow?" Elliott v. Thomas, 937 F.2d
338, 344 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1242 (1992).
65. 751 F.2d at 1472.
66. Id. at 1479.
67. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1988). The Rules Enabling Act provides in relevant part:
(a) The Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe general rules of
practice and procedure and rules of evidence for cases in the United States dis-
trict courts ... and courts of appeals.
(b) Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right. All
laws in conflict with such rules shall be of no further force or effect after such
rules have taken effect.
Id.; see also Schultea v. Wood, No. 93-2186, 1995 WL 98234, at *10 (5th Cir. Mar. 9, 1995)
(en banc) (Jones, Edith H., J., joined by Jolly, J., and Barksdale, J., specially concurring)
(arguing that "to the extent of any conflict, Rules 8 and 9(b) must yield to vindication of
the defense of immunity").
68. Elliott, 751 F.2d at 1479.
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nations reflected in the Federal Rules.6 9 Rather than approaching the
problem from the perspective of adapting Rule 8(a)(2), Judge Higginbot-
ham found the solution in carefully defining the contours of a well-
pleaded claim. As he explained, "[i]f immunity protects a defendant from
the discovery process,... and the statement of a claim grants access to
that process, as it does under notice pleading, then a well-pleaded claim
must overcome the immunity."70 The fact that, undoubtedly, some meri-
torious claims will be precluded by a plaintiff's inability to conduct dis-
covery is an inevitable byproduct of the policy considerations weighed
when the substantive defense originally was made available to public offi-
cials. 7 Thus, Judge Higginbotham reached the same conclusion as the
majority of the panel in Elliott, but did so by incorporating the require-
ment of overcoming the immunity defense in the complaint as a function
of providing allegations that comply with the meaning of Rule 8(a)(2).72
In Elliott, neither the majority nor Judge Higginbotham made any ref-
erence to Gomez v. Toledo,73 where the Supreme Court held that quali-
fied immunity is an affirmative defense that need not be anticipated by
the plaintiff in his complaint.74 In Elliott v. Thomas,7 5 Judge Easterbrook
writing for the Seventh Circuit, noting the holding of Gomez and the ap-
parent conflict between a heightened pleading requirement and Rules 8
and 9(b), concluded it was "misleading to speak of a 'heightened pleading
requirement.' '76 Gomez made clear that the plaintiff in a section 1983
suit need not do anything in the complaint other than get beyond Rules 8
and 9(b).77 Once the defendant has responded to the complaint by rais-
69. See id. at 1483 (Higginbotham, J., concurring specially). Judge Higginbotham ex-
plained, "I do not know where we find the authority to add the requirement [to Rule 9(b)]
that claims against officials who enjoy immunity from suit shall be pled with particularity."
Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. This view has received post-Leatherman support in Wicks v. Mississippi State
Employment Services, 41 F.3d 991, 994-95 (5th Cir. 1995), where the court insisted that
plaintiff meet the heightened pleading requirement to survive a motion to dismiss before
even limited discovery on the immunity issue would be allowed. Id.
72. Id.
73. 446 U.S. 635 (1980).
74. Id. at 640; see also Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 231 (1991) (reaffirming Gomez).
Gomez is addressed by the Fifth Circuit in Schultea v. Wood, No. 93-2186, 1995 WL 98234,
at *4 (5th Cir. Mar. 9, 1995) (en banc). See infra note 98.
75. 937 F.2d 338 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1242 (1992). Elliott v. Thomas
was one of two cases consolidated for appeal. Id. at 340-41. Most of the issues discussed
arose in the companion case of Propst v. Weir. Id. To avoid confusion with the Fifth
Circuit's decision in Elliott, the Seventh Circuit case will be referred to as Thomas.
76. Id. at 345. He also had trouble with the tactic of characterizing the " 'right not to
be tried' " as substantive, rather than procedural. Id.
77. Id.
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ing the defense of qualified immunity and moving for summary judgment,
Rule 5678 comes into play. Then, the matter is no longer what is required
in the initial complaint, but rather what is required to overcome a motion
for summary judgement.79 Judge Easterbrook concluded that to clear the
initial summary judgment hurdle and be allowed to pursue discovery in a
case implicating qualified immunity, the plaintiff should be required to
produce "some evidence" °8 0 to support the claim in the form of" 'specific,
nonconclusory factual allegations.' "81
B. Siegert and Leatherman
In Siegert v. Gilley,82 a clinical psychiatrist employed by the federal
government brought a Bivens action83 against his former supervisor.
84
He claimed that an allegedly defamatory letter authored by the defend-
ant harmed his future employment prospects.8 5 The United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed the federal dis-
trict court's denial of qualified immunity to defendant Gilley and re-
manded with orders that the case be dismissed for failure to satisfy that
circuit's heightened pleading standard.86 The District of Columbia Cir-
cuit, where state of mind is an essential ingredient of plaintiff's claim,
required plaintiff to plead "specific direct evidence of intent to defeat a
motion to dismiss."87 Although the Supreme Court granted certiorari in
Siegert to resolve the question of heightened pleading in a case implicat-
ing the qualified immunity defense, the majority ultimately disposed of
the case without deciding the propriety of the circuit's direct evidence
requirement. The court concluded that even if direct evidence of motive
78. Rule 56 governs summary judgment procedure in the federal district courts. FED.
R. Civ. P. 56. Rule 56(b) allows a defendant to move for summary judgment "at any
time." Id. at 56(b).
79. Thomas, 937 F.2d at 345.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 346 (quoting Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 236 (1991) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring)).
82. 500 U.S. 226 (1991).
83. When a plaintiff asserts that his constitutional rights have been violated by an offi-
cial acting under color of federal law, as opposed to state law, a Bivens action is the coun-
terpart to a section 1983 action, with the right and the remedy being derived directly from
the Constitution. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics,
403 U.S. 388, 392 (1971).
84. Siegert, 500 U.S. at 229.
85. Id. at 227-29.
86. Id. at 230-31.
87. Kimberlin v. Quinlan, 6 F.3d 789, 793 (D.C. Cir. 1993), cert. granted, 115 S. Ct. 929
(1995); see Siegert v. Gilley, 895 F.2d 797, 801-02 (D.C. Cir. 1990), aff'd on other grounds,
500 U.S. 226 (1991); Whitacre v. Davey, 890 F.2d 1168, 1169 (D.C. Cir. 1989), cert. denied,
497 U.S. 1038 (1990).
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had been pleaded, the complaint failed to allege the violation of any con-
stitutional right.88
Justice Kennedy, concurring in the judgment, would have affirmed the
judgment for the reasons relied upon by the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit. 9 While acknowledging that heightened pleading represents a de-
parture from the requirements of Rules 8 and 9(b), Justice Kennedy
nonetheless characterized qualified immunity as a substantive defense
that overrides procedural rules.9 Finding that the heightened pleading
standard balances "the state of mind component of malice and the objec-
tive test that prevails in qualified immunity analysis," Justice Kennedy
concluded that "[u]pon the assertion of a qualified immunity defense the
plaintiff must put forward specific, nonconclusory factual allegations
which establish malice, or face dismissal."'"
88. Siegert, 500 U.S. at 233. Because plaintiff had voluntarily resigned from his posi-
tion and the allegedly defamatory letter was unrelated to plaintiff's termination of employ-
ment at the hospital, the Court concluded that plaintiff did not suffer constitutional injury
under Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976). Siegert, 500 U.S. at 233-34.
89. Siegert, 500 U.S. at 235 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy criticized the
approach adopted by the majority, which instructs trial and appellate courts to resolve the
constitutional issue, of whether the plaintiff has asserted the violation of a constitutional
right, before determining whether the right was clearly established at the time of the chal-
lenged conduct or whether plaintiff has satisfied the circuit's heightened pleading require-
ments. Id.
Post-Siegert, courts of appeals have taken different views as to whether the analytical
structure set out in Siegert for addressing claims of qualified immunity is discretionary or
mandatory. Compare Romero v. Fay, No. 94-2042, 1995 WL 31861, at *6 (10th Cir. Jan. 25,
1995) (holding Siegert mandates that district courts first ascertain whether the plaintiff as-
serts facts that establish the violation of a constitutional right at all) and Macias v. Raul A.
(Unknown), 23 F.3d 94, 98 (5th Cir.) (interpreting "Siegert as first requiring the determina-
tion whether the plaintiff has stated a constitutional violation before reaching the qualified
immunity issue"), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 220 (1994) and Silver v. Franklin Township, 966
F.2d 1031, 1035-36 (6th Cir. 1992) (viewing Siegert as issuing a "directive ... that before
reaching a qualified immunity issue a court should determine whether there has been a
constitutional violation") with DiMeglio v. Haines, No. 94-1569, 1995 WL 40583, at *5 (4th
Cir. Feb. 2, 1995) (holding that "Siegert did not mandate that courts determine, as a part of
the qualified immunity analysis, whether the plaintiff has stated a claim upon which relief
can be granted [or] .... require that courts decide the merits of the constitutional claim")
and Spivey v. Elliott, 41 F.3d 1497, 1498 (11th Cir. 1995) (withdrawing a panel opinion that
had decided the merits of the constitutional claim and stating that "[ulpon reconsideration
on the suggestion of other members of this Court, we now think it enough to decide that
there was no clearly established constitutional right allegedly violated by the defendants")
and Acierno v. Cloutier, 40 F.3d 597, 606 n.7 (3d Cir. 1994) (en banc) (noting that Siegert
does not hold "that courts of appeals must always as an initial inquiry address whether a
constitutional violation has been alleged by the plaintiff").
90. Siegert, 500 U.S. at 236.
91. Id. at 235-36. Significantly, Justice Kennedy rejected the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit's requirement that the plaintiff plead only direct as opposed to circumstantial evidence
of intent. Id. at 236.
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Justice Marshall, in a dissent joined by Justices Blackmun and Stevens,
disagreed with the majority's conclusion that Siegert had not stated a jus-
ticiable constitutional claim.92 The dissent also addressed the question of
whether a heightened pleading standard must be satisfied before discov-
ery can be undertaken in individual capacity suits in which malice is al-
leged and qualified immunity is raised as a defense.93 Finding the District
of Columbia Circuit's direct evidence requirement lacking in precedent
or common sense, the dissent was of the view that "a plaintiff pleading a
Bivens claim that requires proof of the defendant's intent should be af-
forded such discovery whenever the plaintiff has gone beyond bare, con-
clusory allegations of unconstitutional purpose. 94
In Leatherman, the Supreme Court expressly reserved the question of
whether qualified immunity jurisprudence requires heightened pleading
in cases involving individual government officials.95 Thus, in terms of in-
sight into the Supreme Court's position on heightened pleading in the
qualified immunity context, the significance of Siegert and Leatherman is
limited. Two currently sitting Supreme Court Justices have rejected the
District of Columbia Circuit's requirement that a plaintiff plead direct
evidence of intent when state of mind is an element of the underlying
constitutional claim.96 Both Justices, however, would require plaintiff to
plead more than "conclusory allegations of unconstitutional purpose" to
avoid dismissal and initiate discovery.97
C. Post-Leatherman
In the wake of Leatherman and the Supreme Court's express reserva-
tion with respect to the application of Leatherman to individual capacity
claims, lower federal courts predictably have reached conflicting conclu-
sions as to the scope of the rationale underlying the Court's decision. As
of this Article, only three courts of appeals have addressed the issue in
more than a perfunctory manner.98 Examination of these cases uncovers
92. Id. at 239 (Marshall, J., joined by Justice Blackmun and Justice Stevens as to Parts
II and III, dissenting).
93. Id. at 238 (suggesting that because the case presented no unusual circumstances,
the issue not addressed in the petition for certiorari should go unheard).
94. Id. at 246.
95. Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 113 S.
Ct. 1160, 1162 (1993).
96. Siegert, 500 U.S. at 236 (Kennedy, J., concurring); id. at 246 (Stevens, J., joining in
dissent).
97. Id. at 246 (Stevens, J., joining in dissent).
98. See Mendocino Envtl. Ctr. v. Mendocino County, 14 F.3d 457 (9th Cir. 1994);
Branch v. Tunnell, 14 F.3d 449 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2704 (1994); Triad Assocs.,
Inc. v. Robinson, 10 F.3d 492 (7th Cir. 1993); Kimberlin v. Quinlan, 6 F.3d 789 (D.C. Cir.
1994]
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1993), cert. granted, 115 S. Ct. 929 (1995); Moore v. Agency for Int'l Dev., 994 F.2d 874
(D.C. Cir. 1993).
After this Article was in page proofs, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit rendered
an en banc opinion in Schultea v. Wood, No. 93-2186, 1995 WL 98234 (5th Cir. Mar. 9,
1995) (en banc), in which the court revisited Elliot and the "heightened pleading" standard
in qualified immunity cases in light of Leatherman. Judge Higginbotham, writing for the
majority of the en banc court, announced a new approach to resolving the tension between
qualified immunity jurisprudence and the Federal Rules. Instead of judicially legislating a
particularity requirement that is not present in Rule 8 or Rule 9(b), the Fifth Circuit "will
draw to center stage a judicial tool explicitly preserved by the Civil Rules, the reply. See
Fed. R. Civ. P. 7(a)." 1995 WL 98234, at *3. The court has thus shifted the demand for
particularity from the complaint to the reply, which ordinarily will be required when the
immunity defense is raised by defendants. The court of appeals summarized this new ap-
proach as follows:
Our answer to Leatherman is that the district court has an array of procedures
that will carry the load as far as pleadings can. First, the district court must insist
that a plaintiff suing a public official under § 1983 file a short and plain statement
of his complaint, a statement that rests on more than conclusions alone. Second,
the court may, in its discretion, insist that a plaintiff file a reply tailored to an
answer pleading the defense of qualified immunity. Vindicating the immunity
doctrine will ordinarily require such a reply, and a district court's discretion not to
do so is narrow indeed when greater detail might assist. The district court may
ban discovery at this threshold pleading stage and may limit any necessary discov-
ery to the defense of qualified immunity. The district court need not allow any
discovery unless it finds that plaintiff has supported his claim with sufficient preci-
sion and factual specificity to raise a genuine issue as to the illegality of defend-
ant's conduct at the time of the alleged acts. Even if such limited discovery is
allowed, at its end, the court can again determine whether the case can proceed
and consider any motions for summary judgment under Rule 56.
Id. at *7. The minority of the en banc court found Judge Higginbotham's resurrection of
the Rule 7 reply a "novel and interesting" approach to the problem, but supported the
continued validity and applicability of Elliott's "heightened pleading" requirement. 1995
WL 98234, at *8 (Jones, Edith H., J., joined by Jolly, J., and Barksdale, J., specially concur-
ring); 1995 WL 98234, at *11 (Garza, Emilio M., J., specially concurring).
In Cameron v. Seitz, 38 F.3d 264 (6th Cir. 1994), the United States Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit recently noted, without reference to Leatherman, that
[olne of the purposes of qualified immunity is to protect government officials
from the exigencies of litigation. Thus, normally a civil rights plaintiff should in-
clude in the original complaint all of the factual allegations necessary to sustain a
conclusion that the defendant violated clearly established law. Failure to do so,
however, is not fatal; the district court should allow the plaintiff an opportunity to
come forward with additional facts or allegations showing that rights were vio-
lated and that those rights were clearly established. Failure at that point to plead
such facts or allegations, however, would make summary judgment or a motion to
dismiss on the ground of qualified immunity appropriate.
Id. at 272 n.2 (citations omitted); see also Castro v. United States, 34 F.3d 106, 111 (2d Cir.
1994) (finding that "qualified immunity is an affirmative defense that a defendant has the
burden of pleading in his answer" and that to state a claim of constitutional violation, a
plaintiff "need not plead facts showing the absence of such a defense"); Babb v. Dorman,
33 F.3d 472, 477-78 (5th Cir. 1994) (declin[ing] "to read into Leatherman any change in the
law respecting actions against individual municipal defendants and conclud[ing] that [it is]
still bound by Elliott and its progeny in determining whether [plaintiff] stated a claim
against [defendant]" given the express reservation of individual capacity claims and apply-
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no consensus as to whether, or to what extent, heightened pleading may
remain a requirement after Leatherman.
In Triad Associates, Inc. v. Robinson," plaintiff corporations, which
provided security services, alleged that the defendant, the Chairman of
the Board of Commissioners of the Chicago Housing Authority (CHA),
intentionally discriminated against white owned security companies.100
The defendant appealed from the district court's denial of a motion to
dismiss based on qualified immunity,101 arguing that Triad failed to allege
discriminatory intent with the requisite specificity.'0 2 Considering it per-
fectly appropriate to review the sufficiency of the complaint as to allega-
tions of intent, when intent is an essential element of the claimed
constitutional injury, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit announced that no special pleading standard is required in quali-
fied immunity cases to survive a motion to dismiss. 10 3
ing Elliott's heightened pleading requirement), Schultea v. Wood, 27 F.3d 1112, 1115 n.2
(5th Cir. 1994) (applying the heightened pleading standard because "the Supreme Court in
Leatherman did not 'consider whether [its] qualified immunity jurisprudence would re-
quire a heightened pleading in cases involving individual government officials' " and re-
jecting plaintiff's contention that the liberal system of pleading is sufficient (alteration in
original)), affd in part and rev'd in part, 47 F.3d 1427 (5th Cir. 1995) (en banc); Tompkins
v. Vickers, 26 F.3d 603, 608 n.3 (5th Cir. 1994) (declining to discuss what the plaintiff must
include in his complaint); Wayfield v. Town of Tisbury, No. 93-1535, 1993 WL 487830, at *1
(1st Cir. Nov. 29, 1993) (indicating civil rights complaints need not be plead with height-
ened particularity), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2764 (1994); Williams v. Alabama State Univ.,
865 F. Supp. 789, 799 n.3 (M.D. Ala. 1994) (holding Leatherman calls into question the
propriety of using heightened pleading in a section 1983 case, but deciding to use a height-
ened pleading standard in this case because the plaintiff did not bring suit against a munici-
pality); Ohio Council of the Blind v. Voinovich, No. C2-93-528, 1994 WL 504405, at *4
(S.D. Ohio Mar. 28, 1994) (noting that the Sixth Circuit has not had an occasion to address
the issue of heightened pleading after the Leatherman decision, but observing that "at least
one district court within the Sixth Circuit has concluded that heightened pleading is no
longer required in an action where qualified immunity is an anticipated defense").
99. 10 F.3d 492 (7th Cir. 1993).
100. Id. at 495.
101. Id. A denial of qualified immunity is immediately appealable "to the extent that it
turns on an issue of law." Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530 (1985).
102. Triad, 10 F.3d at 496.
103. Id. at 497. The Seventh Circuit stated:
in this circuit on a motion to dismiss we require no more from plaintiffs' allega-
tions of intent than what would satisfy Rule 8's notice pleading minimum and
Rule 9(b)'s requirement that motive and intent be pleaded generally. In qualified
immunity cases there is no special pleading standard that need be satisfied to
survive a motion to dismiss.
Id. (citations omitted). The court did acknowledge that Thomas would require plaintiff to
produce a " 'minimum quantum of proof' " of discriminatory intent to defeat a motion for
summary judgment. Id. at 497 n.3; see also Palmer v. Board of Educ., Nos. 93-3591, 94-
1229, 1995 WL 42819, at *7 (7th Cir. Feb. 3, 1995) (confirming the circuit's view that a civil
rights plaintiff need not plead specific facts and suggesting that development of details be
left for later stages of litigation).
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The Seventh Circuit's position, as articulated in Triad, stands at one
end of the spectrum in post-Leatherman decisions.1" Simply, there are
no special pleading requirements for section 1983 claims, even in individ-
ual capacity suits where state of mind is at issue. While neither the Third
Circuit nor the Tenth Circuit has addressed the issue of heightened plead-
ing in individual capacity suits since Leatherman, a number of district
court opinions from those circuits are in accord with the position adopted
by the Seventh Circuit.10 5
At the opposite end of the spectrum, the District of Columbia Circuit
stands alone in applying a heightened pleading standard to all individual
capacity suits.t 6 This standard is applied in conjunction with the require-
104. See Tuite v. Henry, No. 93 C 3248, 1994 WL 55711, at *4 (N.D. IlL. Feb. 22, 1994)
(concluding that "Triad seems to resolve conclusively any lingering doubt about whether
the pleading requirement in this case is anything but the liberal standard set out in Rule
8"); see also Carney v. White, 843 F. Supp. 462, 470 (E.D. Wis. 1994) (finding that since
Leatherman, a heightened pleading requirement is inappropriate for section 1983 suits);
Stein v. Forest Preserve Dist., 829 F. Supp. 251, 258 (N.D. I11. 1993) (explaining that "a
plaintiff's burden at the pleading stage is minimal" and that "as long as [plaintiff] asserts
some facts which either directly or circumstantially support a finding that [defendant] in-
tentionally sought to deprive him of his protectable property interest, [plaintiff] can avoid
dismissal on immunity grounds before discovery").
105. District court decisions in the Tenth Circuit adopting the Seventh Circuit's position
are the following: Gardetto v. Mason, 854 F. Supp. 1520, 1529 n.4 (D. Wyo. 1994) (noting
that "the plaintiff's complaint cannot be subjected to any type of 'heightened pleading
requirement' so as to defeat the defendant's anticipated claim of qualified immunity");
Sapp v. Cunningham, 847 F. Supp. 893, 900 & n.9 (D. Wyo. 1994) (same).
District Court decisions in the Third Circuit adopting the Seventh Circuit's position are
the following: Loftus v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., 843 F. Supp. 981, 985 n.4 (E.D. Pa.
1994) (noting that "[miost courts in the district ... appear to have read Leatherman to
have eliminated the requirement of 'heightened specificity' in all § 1983 actions including
those against individual government officials"); McCallen v. Holland-Hull, No. Civ.A.93-
3415, 1994 WL 34251, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 31, 1994) (stating that Leatherman compels
rejection of any use of a heightened pleading standard in section 1983 cases even though it
"explicitly does not address pleading standards in civil rights cases against non-municipal
defendants"); Timmons v. Cisneros, No. Civ.A.93-1854, 1993 WL 276863, at *1 (E.D. Pa.
July 22, 1993) (noting the "the rationale of Leatherman would appear to apply equally to
the case of an official employed by a municipality"); Johnson v. Lancaster County Children
& Youth Social Serv. Agency, No. Civ.A.92-7135, 1993 WL 245280, at *9 (E.D. Pa. July 2,
1993) (holding that a "federal court may not apply a 'heightened pleading standard' " in a
civil rights action, but it must follow the normal pleading requirements of Rule 8(a)). But
see Biase v. Kaplan, 852 F. Supp. 268, 287 n.15 (D.N.J. 1994) (requiring the plaintiff to
plead specific, nonconclusory allegations of unlawful intent and finding that nowhere in
Leatherman did the Supreme Court obviate the need for heightened pleading in a Bivens
action).
106. See, e.g., Hunter v. District of Columbia, 943 F.2d 69, 76-77 (D.C. Cir. 1991)
("When a plaintiff claims that an officer used excessive force, the heightened pleading stan-
dard demands that he make 'nonconclusory allegations of evidence' sufficient to demon-
strate that the force used actually was unreasonable."). Although malice or impermissible
motive need not be alleged to state a Fourth Amendment excessive force claim, see gener-
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ment that, in those suits in which state of mind is at issue, the complaint
must contain allegations of direct evidence of intent or unconstitutional
motive to withstand a motion to dismiss. 107
In Kimberlin v. Quinlan,"°8 the plaintiff was a federal prisoner who an-
nounced to the news media, just prior to the 1988 presidential election,
that he once had sold marijuana to vice-presidential candidate Dan
Quayle when Quayle was a law student.1"9 Following this announcement,
NBC News requested and was granted an interview with Kimberlin.
Many other interview requests resulted, causing the Acting Warden ini-
tially to schedule a press conference for Kimberlin. The defendant Quin-
lan, the Director of the Bureau of Prisons, canceled the press conference
because he prohibited press conferences by prisoners.110 Subsequently,
Kimberlin was held in administrative detention on three different occa-
sions, twice before the November 8, 1988 election and once on December
22, 1988.111
Kimberlin brought a Bivens action against Quinlan and Miller, the Di-
rector of Public Affairs at the Department of Justice, alleging that his
administrative detention on the first two occasions was an attempt to
deny him access to the news media and the third detention was in retalia-
tion for his communication with the media. 112 Kimberlin claimed that the
defendants violated his First and Fifth Amendment rights.'13 The federal
district court denied defendants' alternative motion to dismiss or for sum-
mary judgment based on qualified immunity." 4 The defendants ap-
pealed, claiming that in each instance of administrative detention their
conduct was objectively reasonable under the facts as set forth in the
record.1 15
ally Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989), and Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985),
the District of Columbia Circuit has required heightened pleading in that context.
107. Kimberlin v. Quinlan, 6 F.3d 789, 793 (D.C. Cir. 1993), cert. granted, 115 S. Ct. 929
(1995). In Kartseva v. Department of State, 37 F.3d 1524 (D.C. Cir. 1994), Judge Wald
noted the District of Columbia Circuit applies two levels of heightened pleading. Id. at
1531. Level one applies to Bivens and section 1983 claims, and level two applies in cases
which the defendant's state of mind is at issue. Id.
108. 6 F.3d at 789.
109. Id. at 791.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 792.
112. Id. at 790-91, 793.
113. Id. at 790-91.
114. Id. The District of Columbia Circuit noted that it was treating the motion as one
for summary judgment "[blecause the parties submitted and the district court considered
materials outside the pleadings." Id. at 793 n.7.
115. id. at 793. Defendants had submitted evidence to support their contention that
they placed Kimberlin in administrative detention once for his own protection and twice
for violating the prison regulation against third-party telephone calls. See id. at 792-93.
19941
80 Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 44:59
The District of Columbia Circuit noted that circuit precedent 1 6 re-
quired "pleading of specific direct evidence of intent to defeat a motion to
dismiss and subsequent production of such evidence to defeat a motion
for summary judgment""' 7 and that Kimberlin had failed to satisfy this
burden. Consequently, the District of Columbia Circuit reversed the dis-
trict court's denial of summary judgment based on qualified immunity." 8
The majority in Kimberlin treated the defendants' motion as one for sum-
mary judgment,119 agreeing with the Seventh Circuit in Thomas that at
the summary judgment stage the terminology " 'heightened pleading' " is
a misnomer, and the requirement is more accurately depicted as one of
"'heightened production.' "120
Unlike the Seventh Circuit, however, the District of Columbia Circuit
does apply a heightened pleading standard when the defendant simply
files a motion to dismiss. The Kimberlin court described the circuit's
standard as one that required a plaintiff to "plead or produce, depending
on the stage of litigation, direct evidence of unconstitutional intent."' 21
The court justified the standard as necessary to give effect to the immu-
nity from suit that is afforded to objectively reasonable behavior of gov-
ernment officials.' 2 2  As Judge Williams explained, "[t]he restriction
arose out of an effort to reconcile conflicting goals: to protect officials
116. Id. at 794 (citing Siegert v. Gilley, 895 F.2d 797 (D.C. Cir. 1990), aff'd on other
grounds, 500 U.S. 226 (1991); Whitacre v. Davey, 890 F.2d 1168 (D.C. Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 497 U.S. 1038 (1990); Martin v. Malhoyt, 830 F.2d 237 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Martin v.
District of Columbia Metro. Police Dep't, 812 F.2d 1425 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Smith v. Nixon,
807 F.2d 197 (D.C. Cir. 1986); Hobson v. Wilson, 737 F.2d 1 (1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S.
1084 (1985)).
117. Id. at 793-94.
118. Id. at 797-98. The court characterized the evidence relied on by Kimberlin as mere
"inference and weak circumstantial evidence." Id. at 797.
119. Id. at 793 n.7.
120. Id. at 794 n.8 (citing Elliott v. Thomas, 937 F.2d 338, 345 (7th Cir. 1991), cert.
denied, 112 S. Ct. 1242 (1992)); see also Kimberlin v. Quinlan, 17 F.3d 1525, 1525 n.1 (D.C.
Cir. 1994) (on appellee's suggestion for rehearing in banc) (Williams, J.) (explaining that
although the circuit's direct evidence rule is a variation of a heightened pleading standard,
"in fact the 'standard' normally has nothing to do with pleading, but simply allows sum-
mary judgment to be granted before the plaintiff has had as great an opportunity to subject
defendant to discovery as is conventionally available").
121. Kimberlin, 6 F.3d at 796 n.12. The District of Columbia Circuit acknowledged
that, while most other circuits had adopted a form of heightened pleading in individual
capacity suits, "the direct/circumstantial distinction" employed by the District of Columbia
Circuit had not been adopted elsewhere. Id. at 794. In fact, as Judge Williams notes in his
concurring opinion, the only circuits to consider the direct evidence rule explicitly have
rejected it. Id. at 798 (Williams, J., concurring) (citing Branch v. Tunnell, 937 F.2d 1382,
1386-87 (9th Cir. 1991); Elliott, 937 F.2d at 344-45)); see Crutcher v. Kentucky, 883 F.2d
502, 504 (6th Cir. 1989).
122. Kimberlin, 6 F.3d at 793.
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with qualified immunity from undue litigation burdens and to afford legal
remedies for citizens whose rights may have been abused." '123
Judge Edwards, writing a strong dissent in Kimberlin, first questioned
the validity, post-Leatherman, of any heightened pleading standard not
authorized by the Federal Rules.124 Second, he criticized the District of
Columbia Circuit's unique "'direct evidence rule'" as having "no foun-
dation in reason or in the case law."' 25 According to the dissent, the
rationale of the Supreme Court's decision in Leatherman, which finds
standards of heightened pleading basically incompatible with the liberal
notice pleading requirements of Rules 8(a) and 9(b), "casts doubt on the
validity of any judge-made 'heightened pleading' standard imposed in
any context.'
126
Even assuming some level of heightened pleading could be justified in
individual capacity suits involving the qualified immunity defense, the
dissent aptly characterizes the direct evidence requirement as "a cynical
perversion of this court's responsibility to strike a balance between the
'evils inevitable' in resolving immunity questions-the evil of shutting out
meritorious civil rights claims, and the evil of exposing Government offi-
cials to the burdens of litigation and liability.- 127 Placing a burden upon
the plaintiff in a civil rights action of pleading direct evidence of unconsti-
tutional motive "would be fatal in all but the rare case in which the de-
fendant confessed.' 128 The dissent correctly concludes that the direct
123. Id. at 798 (Williams, J., concurring).
124. Id. at 799, 804 (Edwards, J., dissenting).
125. Id. at 799. Judge Edwards reviewed the circuit's decisions that allegedly formed
the basis for the direct evidence rule and demonstrated persuasively that the circuit's
precedents reflect considerable confusion as to the precise formulation of the heightened
pleading standard. Id. at 805-08; see also Kimberlin v. Quinlan, 17 F.3d 1525, 1528 (D.C.
Cir. 1994) (Edwards, J., joined by Mikva, C.J., and Wald, J., dissenting from the denial of
the suggestion for rehearing en banc) ("At best ... the law of the circuit is in disarray, and
en banc review is needed to repair this situation.").
126. Kimberlin, 6 F.3d at 799. Judge Edwards concluded that "[t]he Court's decision in
Leatherman thus employs a strict reading of Rules 8 and 9 that suggests strongly that any
heightened pleading standard is impossible to square with the Rules, and is therefore inva-
lid." Id. at 804.
127. Id. at 810 (citing Harlow v Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 813-14 (1982)).
128. Elliott v. Thomas, 937 F.2d 338, 345 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1242
(1992); see also Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 246 (1991) (Marshall, J., joined by Black-
mun, J., and Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing because evidence of unconstitutional intent is
controlled by the defendant, any use of a heightened pleading rule in a Bivens action when
defendant's state of mind is an essential element of the plaintiff's claim would be inappro-
priate). In a recent opinion from the United States District Court for the District of Co-
lumbia, the court voiced its concerns about that circuit's direct evidence rule:
To survive a defense of qualified immunity, a claim of a constitutional violation by
a government official which turns on the official's motive must meet the height-
ened pleading standard established in this Circuit. ...
1994]
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evidence rule, with its requirement that plaintiffs "provide more evidence
at the pleading stage than is required to win the case at trial,"' 29 cannot
be interpreted as an effort to balance competing concerns underlying the
qualified immunity defense. Instead, it can only be viewed as an "irra-
tional and arbitrary" device that, when it applies, slams the courthouse
doors in the plaintiff's face.13° Should a form of heightened pleading,
when qualified immunity is in issue, eventually survive Supreme Court
scrutiny, common sense and fairness would dictate that the District of
Columbia Circuit's direct evidence rule should be soundly rejected.
The Ninth Circuit's post-Leatherman decisions place that circuit
roughly at the midpoint of the spectrum between the positions adopted
by the Seventh Circuit and the District of Columbia Circuit. In Branch v.
Tunnell (Branch I),' a pre-Leatherman case, plaintiffs brought a Bivens
action against Tunnell, a Special Agent with the Department of the Inte-
rior's Bureau of Land Management. Branch claimed that Tunnell had
violated his Fourth Amendment rights by knowingly or recklessly making
false statements in an affidavit presented to the magistrate judge while
procuring warrants to search Branch's home and business.' 32 The district
court denied defendant's motion to dismiss based on qualified immunity
grounds.' 33 The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that when subjective in-
tent is an element of plaintiff's underlying constitutional claim, a height-
ened pleading standard must be satisfied.' 34 The Ninth Circuit held that
to survive a motion to dismiss, plaintiffs must plead in their complaint
[D]irect evidence of unconstitutional intent is very hard to plead or produce,
especially without the benefit of discovery. With the best evidence of unconstitu-
tional motive often under defendants' control, plaintiffs are rarely in a position to
plead or produce enough direct evidence to meet the heightened pleading stan-
dard. In fact, the heightened pleading standard appears to block all cases in
which the defendants do not baldly state their unconstitutional motives, since
even tremendous amounts of circumstantial evidence do not suffice.
Crawford-El v. Britton, 844 F. Supp. 795, 802 (D.D.C. 1994) (citations omitted).
129. Kimberlin, 6 F.3d at 809 (Edwards, J., dissenting); see also Kimberlin, 17 F.3d at
1527 (Edwards, J., joined by Mikva, C.J., and Wald, J., dissenting from the denial of the
suggestion for rehearing en banc) (disagreeing with the use of heightened pleading speci-
ficity in civil rights cases because it requires plaintiffs to "prove more to survive a motion to
dismiss than he or she must prove in order to win at trial").
130. Kimberlin, 17 F.3d at 1529 (Edwards, J., joined by Mikva, C.J., and Wald, J., dis-
senting from the denial of the suggestion for rehearing en banc).
131. 937 F.2d 1382 (9th Cir. 1991).
132. Id. at 1383-84, 1387. The Bureau of Land Management was investigating Branch
to determine whether he was avoiding royalty payments on federal natural gas leases. Id.
at 1383. No charges were ever filed against Branch. Id.
133. Id. at 1383.
134. Id. at 1386.
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"nonconclusory allegations setting forth evidence of unlawful intent."' 35
Expressly rejecting the District of Columbia Circuit's direct evidence
rule, the Ninth Circuit concluded that its rule balanced the various con-
cerns and interests of plaintiffs and government officials.' 3 6
The court emphasized that the standard it was announcing was a low
one, intended to allow courts to weed out "insubstantial" claims prior to
discovery.' 37 It contrasted the minimal burden imposed by the height-
ened pleading standard with the significantly more rigorous standard im-
posed at the summary judgment stage. 138 Because the Ninth Circuit was
adopting a new heightened pleading standard in Branch I, it remanded
the case to the district court with instructions to permit the plaintiffs to
amend their complaint. 139
On remand, plaintiffs amended their complaint and Tunnell again
moved to dismiss for failure to meet the heightened pleading standard
announced in Branch ." The district court granted the motion to dis-
miss, finding the complaint deficient because plaintiffs failed to allege
facts demonstrating that Tunnell knew or should have known that the
statements made in the warrant affidavit were false.' On appeal to the
Ninth Circuit, Branch argued that his amended complaint satisfied the
standard set out in Branch 1"2 Alternatively, Branch argued that if it
were still deficient, the heightened pleading standard adopted by the
Ninth Circuit should be overruled in light of the intervening Supreme
Court decision in Leatherman.4 3
In Branch v. Tunnell (Branch H), the Ninth Circuit disagreed with both
contentions.'" The court found the complaint's allegations insufficient to
demonstrate Tunnell knew or should have known that his statements to
the magistrate were false. 45 It rejected plaintiffs' suggestion that
Leatherman required the court to revisit the heightened pleading stan-
135. Id.
136. Id. at 1386-87. On the particular facts of Branch I, the Ninth Circuit concluded
that because the claim in this case was one of judicial deception, the heightened pleading
standard required plaintiffs to point to specific portions of the warrant affidavit they
claimed to be false, allege "some facts tending to show that the defendant was aware or
should have been aware of the falsity of those statements," and allege that the false state-
ments were necessary to the finding of probable cause by the magistrate judge. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 1387-88.
139. Id.
140. Branch v. Tunnell, 14 F.3d 449, 452 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2704 (1994).
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 455.
144. Id.
145. Id.
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dard it had adopted in Branch J.146 While the court acknowledged Judge
Edwards' view in Kimberlin concerning the scope of the Leatherman ra-
tionale,147 the Supreme Court's express reservation of the issue of a
heightened pleading standard in individual capacity suits left the Ninth
Circuit without authority to reconsider Branch 1.148 Thus, adhering to
the heightened pleading standard of Branch I, the Ninth Circuit affirmed
the dismissal of the complaint.1 49
In Mendocino Environmental Center v. Mendocino County,' 50 a case
decided the same day as Branch II, the Ninth Circuit clarified that its
heightened pleading standard is applicable only in cases in which state of
mind is an essential element of the underlying constitutional tort. 15 1
Should the defendant's subjective intent be irrelevant to the constitu-
tional claim, normal pleading rules and standards apply in deciding a mo-
tion to dismiss. 152
146. Id.
147. Id. at 457 (observing that "the Supreme Court's rationale-the expressio unius
rule-would appear to apply in any case outside the fraud or mistake context in which
federal courts have applied heightened pleading rules").
148. Id. at 456. The Ninth Circuit noted the general rule that " 'one three-judge panel
of this court cannot reconsider or overrule the decision of a prior panel.' " Id. (quoting
United States v. Gay, 967 F.2d 322, 327 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 359 (1992)).
Because of the Supreme Court's explicit limitation of its decision in Leatherman to munici-
pal liability cases, an exception to the general rule that "arises when an intervening
Supreme Court decision undermines an existing precedent of the Ninth Circuit," did not
come into play. Id.
While federal district courts in the Ninth Circuit will be obliged to follow Branch I and
Branch 11, it remains unclear whether there is agreement in the circuit about the extent to
which Leatherman might be interpreted as undermining existing precedent. See Fobbs v.
Holy Cross Health Sys. Corp., 29 F.3d 1439, 1448-49 (9th Cir. 1994) (explaining that the
Supreme Court has rejected a heightened pleading standard and has noted the imposition
of a heightened pleading standard must be undertaken by amending Rules 8 and 9, thereby
making Leatherman's impact unclear). But see Kruse v. Hawaii, 857 F. Supp. 741, 750 (D.
Haw. 1994) ("Given the Branch I1 court's extensive and thoughtful treatment of
Leatherman's impact on the heightened pleading standard in § 1983 actions against indi-
viduals, this court rejects plaintiffs' contention that this standard has a questionable, let
alone dubious, status in this circuit").
149. Branch, 14 F.3d at 457.
150. 14 F.3d 457 (9th Cir. 1994).
151. Id. at 462.
152. Id. at 461-62; see also Housley v. United States, 35 F.3d 400, 401-02 (9th Cir. 1994)
(finding the heightened pleading requirement of Branch I does not apply to defendant
because his subjective intent is not an element of his Bivens claim).
The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas in Todd v. Hawk, 861
F. Supp. 35, 37-38 (N.D. Tex. 1994), criticized the Ninth Circuit's position. Id. (giving the
heightened pleading standard "its broadest application consistent with Leathernan," and
concluding "that to abolish, or even limit as the Ninth Circuit has, the heightened pleading
requirement is to improperly remove much of the protection from suit qualified immunity
is meant to provide").
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The plaintiffs in Mendocino Environmental Center were advocates for
an environmental organization, Earth First!, that opposed logging prac-
tices in Northern California.153 In the winter of 1990, Earth First! em-
barked on a nonviolent political campaign, inviting participants from
across the country to join in " 'Redwood Summer,' " a major protest
against logging practices alleged to be harmful to the environment.'54
According to the plaintiffs, the activities of Earth First!, and especially its
plans for Redwood Summer, were met with considerable opposition and
animus from the logging and timber industry. The plaintiffs also alleged
that local law enforcement officials and FBI agents who were allegedly
involved in an investigation of Earth First! opposed Earth First!
activities. 1
55
On May 24, 1990, plaintiffs Bari and Cherney were seriously injured
when a bomb exploded in Bari's car.1 16 After an investigation of the inci-
dent, Oakland police and FBI agents arrested Bari and Cherney for
transporting explosives.'57 During the course of the investigation, law en-
forcement officials informed the media that the bomb was positioned be-
hind Bari's seat, the implication being that plaintiffs had knowledge that
the bomb was in the car and that the members of Earth First! were
terrorists. 15 8
Plaintiffs sued local law enforcement officials and FBI agents, alleging
violations of their First and Fourth Amendment rights.'59 The district
court denied the FBI agents' motion to dismiss on qualified immunity
grounds, and they appealed. 16  The Ninth Circuit considered each claim
153. Mendocino Environmental Center, 14 F.3d at 459.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 459-60.
159. Id. at 461.
160. Id. at 460. While the Ninth Circuit recognized the right of defendant officials to
appeal the denial of qualified immunity based on the pleadings, the court also reminded
the parties of the Ninth Circuit rule that " '[o]ne such interlocutory appeal is all that a
government official is entitled to and all that we will entertain.' " Id. (quoting Pelletier v.
Federal Home Loan Bank, 968 F.2d 865, 871 (9th Cir. 1992)); see also Abel v. Miller, 904
F.2d 394, 397 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding sequential appeals of pretrial orders denying quali-
fied immunity are not authorized under Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 (1985)). But see
English v. Dyke, 23 F.3d 1086, 1089 (6th Cir. 1994) (noting that "[a] denial of the [qualified
immunity] defense at any stage entitles a defendant to an immediate appeal" regardless of
whether the defendant has already appealed a denial at an earlier stage of litigation).
Because the plaintiff's burden is minimal at the pleadings stage, as compared to the
summary judgment stage, the Ninth Circuit in Mendocino Environmental Center implied
that officials might be better off waiting until after an adverse summary judgment ruling to
take the interlocutory appeal. Mendocino Environmental Center, 14 F.3d at 461.
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asserted by the plaintiffs, first determining whether the claim was subject
to a heightened pleading standard, and, second, if so, determining
whether the claim satisfied the standard. 61
Plaintiffs alleged that law enforcement officials violated their Fourth
Amendment rights by an arrest without probable cause and by an unlaw-
ful search authorized by a warrant based on knowingly-false state-
ments. 162 The Ninth Circuit noted that the purpose of the heightened
pleading standard is to address the tension existing between the objective
reasonableness test of qualified immunity and claims in which subjective
intent is a necessary element of the constitutional tort. 163 The Ninth Cir-
cuit held that the heightened pleading standard is inapplicable in cases in
which subjective intent is irrelevant in establishing the constitutional
wrong. 16 4
A claim of unlawful arrest is dependant upon the objective reasonable-
ness of the officer's decision to arrest, that is, whether a reasonable law
enforcement officer, given the same facts and circumstances confronting
the defendant, would have believed there was probable cause to make an
arrest. 165 Because the state of mind of the officer is irrelevant to deter-
mine whether there was in fact probable cause, as well as to the qualified
immunity inquiry of whether a reasonable officer would have believed
there was probable cause, the Ninth Circuit did not require plaintiffs to
satisfy the heightened pleading standard for the unlawful arrest claim.
1 66
Thus, the district court properly denied defendants' motion to dismiss
that claim.' 67
Plaintiffs based their Fourth Amendment unlawful search claims, how-
ever, on allegations that the defendants knowingly made false statements
to local law'enforcement officials, which were relied upon to procure
search warrants.1 61 Plaintiffs listed specific portions of the affidavits they
claimed were false,' 6 9 provided limited facts from which it could be in-
ferred that defendants knew of the falsity of the information they pro-
161. Mendocino Environmental Center, 14 F.3d at 461-65.
162. Id. at 461.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 461-62.
165. Id. at 462.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. Specifically, plaintiffs claimed that the portions of the affidavits stating that the
bomb was located behind the driver's seat and that there was evidence of'the bomb having
been made in plaintiff Bari's home were false. Id.
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vided to local officials, 7 ' and alleged that the false statements were a
necessary prerequisite for the magistrate to find probable cause.17' Be-
cause claims of judicial deception implicate the defendants' subjective
state of mind, the Ninth Circuit measured the sufficiency of these claims
under the pleading standard announced in Branch 1.172 Accordingly, the
court agreed with the district court that plaintiffs' allegations satisfied the
heightened pleading standard. 73
Like their Fourth Amendment claims based on the deception of the
magistrate, plaintiffs' First Amendment claims asserting that defendants
intended to intimidate plaintiffs and chill their legitimate political expres-
sion turned on the state of mind of the defendants. Thus, these claims
also were subject to Branch I's heightened pleading standard.174 The
Ninth Circuit found that the complaint contained sufficiently specific fac-
tual allegations of impermissible motive by the FBI agents to withstand
the heightened standard.175
Finally, the Ninth Circuit found that the conspiracy claim asserted by
the plaintiffs was pleaded satisfactorily. 176 Plaintiffs alleged a meeting of
the minds among all the defendants, state and federal, for the purpose of
chilling plaintiffs' constitutionally protected political activity and noted
overt acts taken in furtherance of the conspiracy. 77
170. Id. Plaintiffs alleged that the FBI agents knew that the bomb was located under,
not behind, the front seat, Id. The complaint also made reference to the local officer's
affidavit representing that his information about the bomb came from the FBI agents. Id.
at 463. The Ninth Circuit deemed these allegations, although based on affidavits not iden-
tifying by name the particular FBI agent or agents who conveyed the false information,
sufficient to satisfy Branch I's heightened pleading standard. Id. Knowledge as to which
agent or agents actually communicated the false information would be primarily within the
control of the defendants, and plaintiffs would not be required to provide such evidence
prior to discovery. Id. at 463-64.
171. Id. at 463.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 464.
175. Id. The complaint alleged that prior to Redwood Summer, the FBI had engaged
in baseless investigations of other members of Earth First!, that agents provided false infor-
mation with respect to plaintiffs' arrest to disrupt their political activities, and that defend-
ants harbored a "constitutionally impermissible, politically-based animus" against
plaintiffs. Id.
176. Id. at 465.
177. Id. Generally, plaintiffs have been required to plead conspiracies to violate consti-
tutional rights with more specificity than mandated by mere notice pleading. See, e.g.,
Crabtree v. Muchmore, 904 F.2d 1475, 1481 (10th Cir. 1990).
In Loftus v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., 843 F. Supp. 981 (E.D. Pa. 1994), plaintiff
alleged that his employer and his union conspired to deprive him of his employment with-
out due process of law. Id. at 981-82. The district court noted that "[tlhough Leatherman
dealt specifically with a § 1983 claim against a municipality, the ratio decidendi of the case
reaches beyond claims against municipalities." Id. at 984. In applying the rule established
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IV. HARLOW AND HEIGHTENED PLEADING
Use of the heightened pleading standard in individual capacity suits
when subjective intent is an element of the underlying constitutional
claim is most often justified by the Supreme Court's decision in Harlow v.
Fitzgerald.'78 In Harlow, the Supreme Court abandoned the subjective
prong of the qualified immunity defense applied in Wood v. Strickland.'79
Wood held that an official had no qualified immunity in a section 1983
suit "if he knew or reasonably should have known that the action he took
... would violate the constitutional rights of the [plaintiff], or if he took
the action with the malicious intention to cause a deprivation of constitu-
tional rights or other injury to the [plaintiff]."'80 The relevance of the
defendant official's state of mind to the immunity analysis made it un-
likely that the immunity defense would result in the dismissal of the liti-
gation at the summary judgment stage.' 8 '
Under Harlow, the inquiry became an objective one: whether the offi-
cial violated "clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of
which a reasonable person would have known."' 82 In rejecting the sub-
jective component of the qualified immunity test, the Court warned that
mere allegations of malice are insufficient to hold a government official's
feet to the fiery costs of trial or burdensome discovery.' 83
by Leatherman, the district court concluded "that a § 1983 claim, with the possible excep-
tion of actions brought against individual government officials ...must meet only the
pleading requirements of Rule 8(a)(2) and is no longer subject to prior circuit law requir-
ing the claim to be tested against a 'heightened pleading. standard.' " Id. at 985 (citation
omitted); see also Fobbs v. Holy Cross Health Sys. Corp., 29 F.3d 1439, 1448-49 (9th Cir.
1994) (holding the Supreme Court has recently rejected heightened pleading requirements
in almost all cases except fraud and mistake, and any imposition of such heightened stan-
dard would require an amendment of Rules 8 and 9); Boyer v. Pottstown Borough,
CIV.A.94-1716, 1994 WL 385009, at *3 (E.D. Pa. July 19, 1994) (finding plaintiff's allega-
tions in her complaint conclusory, but nonetheless holding them sufficient to provide de-
fendants an opportunity to answer based on the Supreme Court's decision in Leatherman).
But see Biase v. Kaplan, 852 F. Supp. 268,287 (D.N.J. 1994) (explaining that "[a] complaint
cannot survive a motion to dismiss if it contains only conclusory allegations of conspiracy,
but does not support those allegations with averments of the underlying material facts' "
(quoting Flanagan v. Shively, 783 F. Supp. 922, 928-29 (M.D. Pa.), aff'd, 980 F.2d 722 (3d
Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 95 (1993))); Orange v. County of Suffolk, 830 F. Supp.
701, 707 (E.D.N.Y. 1993) (holding Leatherman did not change the requirement of height-
ened pleading in cases alleging a conspiracy).
178. 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
179. Id. at 818-19; see Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975).
180. Wood, 420 U.S. at 322 (emphasis added).
181. The Supreme Court noted the difficulty of summary judgment based upon factual
disputes as to the official's subjective good faith. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 817-18.
[Vol. 44:59
1994] Life After Leatherman
Since Harlow, courts have perceived a "tension" between the objective
focus of the qualified immunity analysis and the need for plaintiffs to
make reference to intent when state of mind is a necessary component of
the underlying constitutional claim.184 To begin to sort out the confu-
sion'85 in this area, Judge Edwards' observation in Kimberlin correctly
explains that "[a]lthough the Court purported to eliminate inquiry into
the subjective intent of Government officials, Harlow did not discuss
cases in which unconstitutional motive is an essential element of the
claim.",186
The qualified immunity analysis involves three separate inquiries: (1)
Does the plaintiff assert the violation of a federal constitutional or statu-
tory right under existing law? (2) Was the right clearly established at the
time of the challenged conduct? and, (3) Would a reasonable official,
given the facts and circumstances confronting the defendant, have under-
stood that her conduct violated plaintiff's clearly established right?
187
A number of courts have recognized that Harlow certainly does not
preclude the plaintiff from asserting, nor the court from considering, alle-
gations relating to defendant's state of mind when subjective intent is a
necessary element of the constitutional claim.' 88 Indeed, allegations of
184. See, e.g., Branch v. Tunnell, 937 F.2d 1382, 1385 (9th Cir. 1991); see also Gainor v.
Rogers, 973 F.2d 1379, 1390 (8th Cir. 1992) (Loken, J., dissenting) (indicating the Supreme
Court failed to address the situation when the defendant's motives are at issue and the
undisputed facts indicate the defendant had an objectively reasonable basis for his actions
and questioning whether a mere allegation of "bad motive [can] defeat summary judge-
ment on qualified immunity grounds").
185. See Stephanie E. Balcerzak, Note, Qualified Immunity for Government Officials:
The Problem of Unconstitutional Purpose in Civil Rights Litigation, 95 YALE L.J. 126, 137
(1985) (explaining that "[tihe Harlow standard of qualified immunity has generated much
confusion in the lower federal courts with respect to how an objective standard should
operate in cases in which the substantive law controlling the plaintiff's claim makes state of
mind an essential element of the constitutional violation").
186. Kimberlin v. Quinlan, 6 F.3d 789, 804 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (Edwards, J., dissenting),
cert. granted, 115 S. Ct. 929 (1995).
187. See, e.g., Brewer v. Wilkinson, 3 F.3d 816, 820 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding that to
determine whether a defendant official is entitled to qualified immunity a court must make
the three separate inquiries), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1081 (1994); Gordon v. Kidd, 971 F.2d
1087, 1093 (4th Cir. 1992) (same); Romero v. Kitsap County, 931 F.2d 624, 627 (9th Cir.
1991) (same).
188. See, e.g., Broderick v. Roache, 996 F.2d 1294, 1297-98 (1st Cir. 1993) (holding that
the district court did not err in taking into consideration defendant's intent in the course of
its qualified immunity analysis in cases in which state of mind is an essential component of
plaintiff's underlying constitutional claim); Hannula v. City of Lakewood, 907 F.2d 129,
132 n.4 (10th Cir. 1990) (noting that "[a]lthough qualified immunity normally involves only
objective standards, inquiry into subjective standards is not precluded when they are essen-
tial elements in a plaintiff's claim"); see also Balcerzak, supra note 185, at 127 (comment-
ing that "[i]t is unlikely that the Court meant for Harlow to prevent a plaintiff from
inquiring into the reasons behind an official's conduct when the substantive law controlling
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defendant's subjective intent must be included by the plaintiff and must
be considered by the court in addressing the first question of the qualified
immunity analysis: whether plaintiff has stated a constitutional claim
upon which relief can be granted.189
State of mind plays no part in steps two and three of the qualified im-
munity analysis. Whether a particular right was established at the time of
the challenged conduct is a question of law that has nothing to do with
defendant's state of mind in a given case.' 90 The final step in the analysis
hinges on the objective reasonableness of the officer's conduct, not his
subjective intent. 191 Thus, intent is relevant to the availability of qualified
immunity only as it relates to plaintiff's statement of a valid claim for
relief. If the constitutional violation asserted does not embody an intent
requirement, then state of mind is irrelevant to the qualified immunity
analysis 9 2 and "bare allegations of malice" should not defeat an immu-
the plaintiff's claim makes the official's state of mind a necessary component of the consti-
tutional violation").
189. See, e.g., Tompkins v. Vickers, 26 F.3d 603, 607 (5th Cir. 1994) (explaining that
"[e]very Circuit that has considered the question has concluded that a public official's mo-
tive or intent must be considered in the qualified immunity analysis where unlawful moti-
vation or intent is a critical element of the alleged constitutional violation"); Wright v.
Jefferson County Police Dep't, No. 92-6203, 1993 WL 503748, at *3 (6th Cir. Dec. 8, 1993)
(explaining that "when intent is an element of the substantive claim, the court must ex-
amine the officer's intent under a qualified immunity analysis to determine if he has vio-
lated 'clearly established' law"); Fiorenzo v. Nolan, 965 F.2d 348, 351-52 (7th Cir. 1992)
(holding when state of mind is at issue the court must determine (1) whether the alleged
actions violate a constitutional right and (2) whether the constitutional right was clearly
established at the time in question and noting that intent was relevant to the first inquiry);
In re Chicago Police Officer Promotions, Nos. 91 C 668, 90 C 1923, 90 C 950, 90 C 5456,
1994 WL 424146, at *13 (N.D. I11. Aug. 11, 1994) (noting that when "intent is an element of
a constitutional claim .... some kernel of proof of that element is necessary to defeat a
motion for summary judgment based upon qualified immunity").
190. See, e.g., Auriemma v. Rice, 910 F.2d 1449, 1453 (7th Cir. 1990) (en banc) (con-
cluding that "when intent is crucial to a party's claim ... the court's consideration of intent
is relevant to the determination of whether a constitutional violation exists but not in de-
ciding if the constitutional standard was clearly established"), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1204
(1991).
191. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818-19 (1982) (discussing the objective reasona-
bleness test in a qualified immunity analysis).
192. See, e.g., Wright v. Jefferson County Police Dep't, No. 92-6203, 1993 WL 503748 at
*3 (6th Cir. Dec. 8, 1993) (finding that "[tihe subjective views of the officers are irrelevant
for purposes of determining qualified immunity to a section 1983 action based on an unrea-
sonable search and seizure"); Pritchett v. Alford, 973 F.2d 307, 315 (4th Cir. 1992) (con-
cluding that an "[i]llegal motive on the officer's part need not also be shown in order to
defeat a qualified immunity defense to a Fourth Amendment claim which itself has no
motive element"); White v. City of Taylor, 849 F. Supp. 1186, 1190 (E.D. Mich. 1994)
(holding that improper intent on the part of police officers need not be shown; instead the
officers behavior is measured by whether it was objectively reasonable).
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nity defense that would otherwise prevail at the discovery stage. 193 This
is the message of Harlow. While holding that plaintiffs may not skirt the
qualified immunity defense simply by alleging malicious intent, the
Harlow Court did not intend to insulate officials from liability whenever
state of mind is essential to the underlying constitutional claim.
194
The tension created in cases involving subjective intent occurs at the
initial step of the qualified immunity analysis, when the issue is whether
the plaintiff has sufficiently pleaded a constitutional claim. If the plaintiff
has indeed satisfactorily pleaded a claim that requires a constitutionally
impermissible state of mind, there are few cases in which the court could
conclude that the law was not clearly established or that a reasonable
officer could have believed such conduct to be constitutional. 195 Thus,
the first step of the qualified immunity analysis will generally be disposi-
tive of the immunity issue at the pleadings stage when subjective intent is
an element of the underlying claim.
This problem is well illustrated in Lindsey v. Shalmy.' 96 In Lindsey,
plaintiff complained that her supervisor, Chief of Enforcement in the
Clark County Department of Business License, discriminated against her
on the basis of gender. 197 Thus, the subjective intent of the defendant
was relevant to the constitutional claim asserted. The district court de-
nied defendant's motion for summary judgment and defendant ap-
pealed. 9 ' Although Lindsey involved a motion for summary judgment,
as opposed to a motion to dismiss, the court's analysis highlights the
problem, or tension, that most courts confront at the motion to dismiss
stage. 199 The court determined some element of subjective intent must
be taken into account when determining if a government official is enti-
tled to immunity.200 Yet, assuming the existence of the disputed motiva-
193. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 817-18.
194. Balcerzak, supra note 185 at 134-35.
195. Cf. Beard v. City of Northglenn, 24 F.3d 110, 114-15 (10th Cir. 1994) (explaining
that no reasonable police officer can believe an arrest legal when the officer's deliberate
deception led to the issuing of the arrest warrant); Horney v. Walla Walla County, CS-93-
055-JBH, 1993 WL 350191, *11 (E.D. Wash. Aug. 31, 1993) (noting that "[i]f defendant's
conduct is arbitrary and capricious, it cannot be objectively reasonable"). But see
Auriemma v. Rice, 910 F.2d 1449, 1458-59 (7th Cir. 1990) (en banc) (holding that the de-
fendant was entitled to qualified immunity on a section 1985(3) conspiracy claim because
the law was not clearly established at the time that whites, as well as blacks, were protected
by the statute), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1204 (1991).
196. 29 F.3d 1382 (9th Cir. 1994).
197. Id. at 1383-84.
198. Id. at 1383.
199. Id. at 1384-85.
200. Id. at 1384.
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tion "would send virtually every claim of unlawful discrimination to
trial. "201
The question becomes whether a heightened pleading standard is
needed to protect officials from undue harassment, interference with job
performance, and the burdens of discovery prior to the summary judg-
ment stage. When should the presence of an element of intent be allowed
to defeat a motion to dismiss? The answer proposed by most courts prior
to, and some courts even in the wake of Leatherman, is only when the
complaint contains "nonconclusory allegations of subjective motivation,
supported either by direct or circumstantial evidence. 20 2 Placing a
heightened burden on plaintiffs at the pleading stage, however, is con-
trary to the language of the Federal Rules, inconsistent with the rationale
of Leatherman, and unnecessary to accommodate the concerns of
Harlow.
V. CONCLUSION.
No special pleading burden should be placed on plaintiffs in section
1983 individual capacity suits, even when plaintiffs are asserting claims
that require subjective intent as an essential element. Under ordinary
notice pleading requirements, a plaintiff is obligated to provide the de-
fendant with "fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the grounds
upon which it rests., 213 While factual detail is not necessary, there should
be some factual allegations supporting each material element of the
claim.20 4 On a motion to dismiss based on qualified immunity, a court
should examine the complaint to determine if plaintiff has satisfied the
minimal requirements of Rule 8(a)(2), nothing more.20 5 Has the plaintiff
alleged the essential elements of a claim for relief and stated the grounds
upon which that claim rests?
Prior to discovery, a court should address and resolve the first two is-
sues in the qualified immunity analysis. If the plaintiff has failed to al-
201. Id.
202. Branch v. Tunnell, 937 F.2d 1382, 1387 (9th Cir. 1991); see Siegert v. Gilley, 500
U.S. 226, 236 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring); Mendocino Envtl. Ctr. v. Mendocino
County, 14 F.3d 457,461 (9th Cir. 1994); Branch v. Tunnell, 14 F.3d 449, 456 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 114 S. Ct. 2704 (1994); see also Balcerzak, supra note 185, at 146 (stating in civil
rights complaints the plaintiff should be required to "support his allegations of unconstitu-
tional purpose or intent . . . by specifying the factual predicate underlying the constitu-
tional deprivation in sufficient detail to establish a prima facie case entitling him to
relief").
203. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957).
204. See, e.g., Gallardo v. Board of County Comm'rs, 857 F. Supp. 783, 787 (D. Kan.
1994) (discussing ordinary pleading requirements of Rule 8(a)).
205. See Triad Assocs., Inc. v. Robinson, 10 F.3d 492, 497 (7th Cir. 1993).
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lege, under the minimal standards of notice pleading, the material
elements of a federal constitutional or statutory claim, then the complaint
should be dismissed on the merits for failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted. Even if the complaint states a claim under current
law, the court may still grant the motion to dismiss on qualified immunity
grounds if the right plaintiff asserts was not clearly established when the
challenged conduct occurred. This issue is purely legal and can be re-
solved by the court during the earliest stages of the litigation. The third
step of the immunity analysis determines the objective reasonableness of
the defendant's conduct and takes into consideration the facts and cir-
cumstances known to the defendant at the time. This generally requires
more information than the plaintiff need allege in the complaint under
notice pleading and is better addressed by summary judgment
procedures.
Unless a defendant is satisfied that plaintiff states no claim upon which
relief can be granted under the generous standards of notice pleading or
that the right plaintiff asserts was not clearly established, defendant
should raise the qualified immunity defense by way of a motion for sum-
mary judgment under Rule 56206 rather than by way of a motion to dis-
miss under Rule 12(b)(6).20 7 Once a defendant moves for summary
judgment, the plaintiff cannot merely rely on the minimal allegations in
the complaint, but must submit "specific, nonconclusory factual allega-
tions" to support the claim.2"' If the motion is made prior to discovery20 9
206. FED. R. Civ. P. 56; see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 319 (1986); Ander-
son v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 244 (1986); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith
Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 578 (1986). For a discussion addressing the history, develop-
ment, and application of summary judgment principles, see generally William W.
Schwarzer et al., The Analysis and Decision of Summary Judgment Motions, 139 F.R.D.
441 (1992).
207. See, e.g., Tuite v. Henry, No. 93 C 3248, 1994 WL 55711, at *4 (N.D. 11. Feb. 22,
1994) (explaining that "Triad ... seems to indicate strongly that if the defendants wish to
raise qualified immunity as a defense, they should do so in a summary judgment motion
rather than in a motion to dismiss").
208. Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 236 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also
Tompkins v. Vickers, 26 F.3d 603, 608 (5th Cir. 1994) (noting that "[alt the summary judg-
ment stage, [plaintiff] cannot rely on allegations; he must produce specific support for his
claim of unconstitutional motive"); Howard v. Suskie, 26 F.3d 84, 87 (8th Cir. 1994) (find-
ing that plaintiff bears the burden of moving beyond mere allegations in his pleadings to
"establishing a genuine dispute regarding [defendant's] motivation in imposing the ...
sanction"); Hill v. Shelander, 992 F.2d 714, 717 (7th Cir. 1993) (finding that "[blecause
[plaintiff] has thus asserted a constitutional claim requiring proof of intent, he must adduce
specific factual support for his allegation of bad intent to survive a motion for summary
judgment").
209. It should be noted that Rule 56(b) allows a defending party to move "at any time"
for summary judgment. FED. R. Civ. P. 56(b). As Judge Easterbrook noted in Thomas,
this provision authorizes motions prior to any discovery. Elliott v. Thomas, 937 F.2d 338,
1994]
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and a plaintiff lacks the specific factual information to support the mate-
rial elements of the claim, the plaintiff could move for discovery under
Rule 56(f)21° and the court could limit such discovery to matters related
to the qualified immunity issue.211 In cases in which a defendant's state
of mind is crucial to the underlying substantive claim and in which facts
pertaining to that issue are "peculiarly within the control of the defend-
ant, 212 plaintiffs should be allowed discovery " 'tailored specifically to
the question of ... qualified immunity.' "213
In summary, notice pleading requirements serve to weed out truly friv-
olous claims from the judicial system. Even claims that state a claim
upon which relief may be granted under applicable law will fail at the
pleading stage unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the law was
345 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 973 (1992); see also Thrower v. Barney, 849 F.
Supp. 1445, 1446 (N.D. Ala. 1994) (explaining that "[tlhe amended rules [particularly Rule
26(f)] contemplate that no discovery shall be undertaken until after the parties meet and
confer" but that "the rules do not stand in the way of the filing of a motion to dismiss or of
a motion for summary judgment before discovery").
210. See FED. R. Civ. P. 56(f).
211. As one commentator has observed:
Because a defendant may make a motion for summary judgment at the com-
mencement of a suit, a plaintiff could be placed in the same situation presented by
the heightened standard-i.e., compelled to allege facts that are as yet unknown.
Rule 56(f), however, gives a court the means to allow the plaintiff to discover the
existence of any necessary elements of the claim. After postponing a summary
judgment decision under 56(f), a court could allow sufficient discovery to deter-
mine the merits of the claim. The discovery granted need not have the same
debilitating effects that summary judgment seeks to avoid. First, a plaintiff is not
automatically entitled to a Rule 56(f) motion. The plaintiff must convince the
court that the information sought could not have been obtained earlier and that
the requested discovery is likely to unearth sufficient facts to defeat the summary
judgment motion. A defendant could then serve depositions on the plaintiff to
discover any deficiencies of the plaintiff's allegations on the immunity question,
and successfully move for summary judgment if the allegations are insufficient. In
this way, Rule 56(f) would allow courts to tailor discovery to the minimum
amount necessary to determine the merits of a claim.
Cottrell, supra note 4, at 1110-11 (footnotes omitted); see also Castro v. United States, 34
F.3d 106, 111 (2d Cir. 1994) (finding that when defendants' conduct appears unreasonable
and certain facts are solely within defendants' knowledge, summary judgement will rarely
be granted without permitting the plaintiff discovery concerning items bearing on defend-
ants' claims of immunity); Lion Boulos v. Wilson, 834 F.2d 504, 507-08 (5th Cir. 1987)
(allowing discovery "narrowly tailored to uncover only those facts needed to rule on the
immunity claim"); Williams v. County of Sullivan, 157 F.R.D. 6, 9 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (same).
212. Siegert, 500 U.S. at 246 (Marshall, J., joined by Blackmun, J., and Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
213. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 647 n.6
(1987)); see also Hill v. Shelander, 992 F.2d 714, 717 (7th Cir. 1993) (noting that "despite
Harlow's focus on a purely objective inquiry, the plaintiff must be afforded an adequate
opportunity to establish intent when it is an element of the alleged constitutional
violation").
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clearly established when the defendant's conduct occurred. Summary
judgment demands require the plaintiff's claim to meet a more rigorous
standard and are sufficient to prevent non-meritorious claims from reach-
ing the trial stage.214
214. See Tompkins v. Vickers, 26 F.3d 603, 608 (5th Cir. 1994) (stating that the court is
"convinced that the requirements of Rule 56 accommodate the interests of public officials
seeking protection from groundless claims as well as the interests of plaintiffs seeking vin-
dication of constitutional rights").

